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ADSTRACT 
The changing defense acquisition process and the decl ining defense budget 
require alternative methods for sustaining unique sectors of the defense ttthnology 
industrial base (DTlB). such as the chemical sector. One method is the dual-usc of the 
technology by the producers within the hase to manufacture the products required to 
provide Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) defensive support for the nation. As 
the size of the defense budget and force structure shrinks, so wi ll the number of producers 
within the chemical industrial base (eIB) but the need for alternative sustainment 
methods will increase. The purpose of this thesis is to analY7..e and detennim:: if dual-use 
can be applied and what benefits it offers the ClB . Successful applications of the dual-
use of technology have taken place in other defense sectors. The intent of this thesis is 
also to analyze and review areas of successfu l uses in other sectors. The analysis of dual-
use in the cm was conducted by obtaining the opinions of experts in the areas of dual-
usc. DTI B, and em through interviews. This research determined that dual-usc can be 
applied to the CIS in the areas of detection, individual prote(tion, collective protective 
filtration. and biological defensc. Additionally, this research identified that the dual-
production (i .e., reusc or joint usc) ofthc production facilities is a" important as thc dual-
usc of the technology. The research concludes that 000 should further promote dual-use 
as a means of sustaining and retaining producers in the eIB. 
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I. I NTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and determine if dual-us\!' can be used 10 
sustain the Chemical Industrial Base (e 18) and what benefits it offers. Successful 
applications of the dual-use of technology have taken place in acquisition of ddcnsc 
systems. The intent of this thesis is also to analyze and review areas with successfu l uses 
of the dual-use technology in other sectors of the Defense Industrial Base (DIU). This 
introduction provides the background and objectives for this thesis Additionally it 
includes a list or the research questions addressed and discusses the scope, the limitations 
and the assumptions made during the fonnulat ioll of the thesis. A brief summary of the 
thesis methodology is provided and the organization of the thesis is described. 
A. BACKGROUND 
An American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA) White Paper in 
Nalional Defense provided infonnation about the latest problem fOf the Department of 
Defense (000 ): the lack of su fficient advanced teclUlology in the industrial hase. The 
art icle also reveals that the growing deficit plac!;.":s more emphasis on the ability of 000 to 
sustain an industrial base that is teelmologically capable of supporting our wanim!;.": needs. 
(National Defense , 1993. p. 35) The 000 draw-down indicates the likelihood of 
decreased production in the DIU, reflected in the depamue of various producers from the 
base. Although the reductions will have a stronger impact on the sectors of the base that 
hav!;.": littk or no comm!;'":feial applications, all producers in th!;.": industrial base will 
experience decreases in production. (National Defense, \993, p. 35) 
The results of this industrial base decline will be more intense tor lower-lier 
contractors that an: solely depend!;.":nt (atkas! 50 percent or more oflheir bu:;iness) on the 
000 for business. (National Defense, 1993, p. 35) The likelihood of more budget 
declines and dmw-downs will b!;.":eome more vi sible :c; large defense contractors hold on 
to 000 productions to sustain their husiness base. The larger defense contractors, by 
retaining productions for themselves, will propel the effects ofthe defense draw-downs to 
the lower-level eontral,;tors. These effects will worsen as prospects of more budgl:t 
declines make their way through the smaller sectors of the industrial base. The large 
defense contractors view 000 contracts as a means to retain their viability in the hase 
There are many concerns in tlk: 000 and the commercial world ahout lhe survival 
of the industrial base. The concerns focus on accl:ss to advanl,;ed technology by defense 
contractors due to thl: traditional emphasis of the hase on defense-specific systems and 
technologies 
The ADPA White Paper, previously mentioned, stated that the bulk of U.S. 
manufacturers are small businesses that comprisc thc majority of the U.S. production 
base. This reveals that subcontractors are really the life line for thl: nation's wartime 
industrial support. Considl:ring this infonnation, the 000 stands to lose much of its 
industrial support if it fai ls to make provisions that will allow sustairullt,:nt of thl: small 
scctors or the industrial hasc. (National Defcnse, 1993, p. 37) 
Small companies are unable to expand and keep pace with the advances in 
technology that larger defense companies can achieve due to insufficient flUlding and 
capability . (National Defense, 1993, p. 37) This deficiency worsens when smaller, more 
discrete sectors of the hasc, like the chemical sector, arc explored 
rhere is a very limited number of manufacturers in the industrial hase with a 
capability 10 produce the chemical equipment thaI providl:s chemical defensiw support 
for the U.S. anned forces. Thl:se manufacturers already face the challenge of small and 
limitl:d procurl:ments with limited budget dollars. "fhl: challenges grow because the force 
structure's draw-dO .... 'Il will further fl:duce the munber of procurements and potclltial 
contractors. It is because the cm producers may in some instances "lack experience and 
specialized knowledge to shift. to commercial production and compete successfully in 
conunereial markets" that there may be a tremendous dual-use potentia!. The potemial 
exists hecause to use the knowledge and technology gained in defense productions allows 
cm producers to gain the experience and knowledge fo r commercial t ITans. (GAO 
Repon. 1993. p. 4) 
['he CIB is the sector of the DlB composed of small and large defense contractors 
that produce a variety of Chemical Defensive Equipment (CD E). This CDE provides the 
defensive protection of the nation's Amled Services against Nuclear, Biological , and 
Chemical (NBC) agents in war. These producers are uniquely different from the other 
sectors of the industrial base primarily due to their large reliance on 000 for work 
because there is little commercial use for the speciali zed equipment produced. The 
equi pmcIJ[ in Table I are the typical items manutactured by CIA producers. 
TABLE I: Equipment Manufactured by em Producers 
Equip""'''' Calcgo,}' 
Source (CBDCOM. 1994. pp . A·2 ·1 A·2·6j 
The U.S Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) 
conducted a eiB sector study for the Joint Logistics Commanders (lLC). This study 
assessed the ovt:rall health of the CIB ilnd found the CIll sectvr was "stable" but required 
continuous monitoring. (CBDCOM, J 994 . p. 45/ Tbe monitoring ensures resolution of 
the defici encies when reasonably possible 
Some t:xperts have predicted that barring a national emergency defense 
spending could drop below $200 billion·-again in constant [994 dollars--
by the tum of the century, a level lIot seen since 1940. (Kit field, 1993, p. 
18) 
I Chapl~r 11 provide, further in formatwn un the CBOCOM , tu dy ,~,ull s 
The prospects of such a dedining budget combined with reductions in 
subcontracting are aU the morc reason why dual-use would be wise for the defense 
department. Dual-usc is an avenue for DoD (0 have a minimum number of qualified 
producers in the industrial base to produce weapons and suppon systems for wartime 
nceds. The benefits of having more than one qualified producer or manufaclUrer are· 
"quick logistic response, reduction of long productioo lead times, and reduction of 
teclmology cost and schedule risks." (Mcilvaine, 1994. p.32) An additional henefit is 
long term business for the producer. 
A 1993 General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 199 1 required 000 to provide an aJUlual 
report to Congress on the viability of the OIB. The report further revealed that 000 felt 
that· 
. .Their ability to meet future national security needs will depend on the 
ability of individual companies to shift from defense to commercial 
production as required. This statement clearly indicates that 000 realizes 
the imponanee of dual-use technology. It also indicates DoD's openness 
to the actions required to provide an opportunity to sustain the DIB 
(GAO, 1993, p. 3) 
The dual-usc of tcchnology2 permits contractors to use the technology gained 
from military procurements in commercial applications. The 9mm Beretta family of 
pistols is a successful example of the application of the dual-usc tcclmology concept. The 
civilian and military law enforcement officiab along with special operations forces use 
the weapon. The dual-use benefit of this weapon is that production for both versions 
occurs at the same time on the same production line (Mcilvaine, 1994, pp. 33-34). 
Dual-use H::c1mology's application to the CIA will allow producers to improve 
their capability to succeed in the commercial sector and decrease their reliance on defense 
contracts. The improved contractor potential will also provide the technological edge the 
nation's industrial base needs for support in time of war. 
'Chaple, II prov ide, funhcr inform.tion on dual-use technology and OoD·, po lici~ 
B. 08JECI'IVES 
The objective of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of dual-use technology for 
the sustainmcnt of the contractors and suhcontractors in the cm. Another objecti ve of 
this research is \0 detemline Ihe desirability within DoD to use this concept to sustain the 
cm. Fo llowing this determination. this thesis discusses the effective use of dual -use and 
the disadvantages and advantages of this application. Finally, this thesis provides 
recommendations of areas of further study for the U.S. Anny and the DoD to consider 
regarding dual-use technology and the cm 
This topic is important to the Army and 000 hecause it offers the potential to : 
Allow sustainment of the cm. 
AHow the Govermnent to gain a technological edge 
Reduce the cost, schedule and perfomlancc risks for the Government and 
Ensure that sufficient weapon systems and support items are available to 
support the national defense objectives 
C, RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
I. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question to be answered within this thesis is' What afe the 
benefits of using the concept of dual-use technology to sustain the CIA? 
2. Subsidiary Re.fearch Que.fiilJllS 
The subsidiary research qw:stions tu be answered within this thesis are: 
What is the em? 
What types of industries make up this eIB? 
What makes the Chemical sector Ullique from other sectors of the DIB? 
Does the current situation of the Department of Defense budget and 
downsizing require the application of dual-use technology? 
What is dual-use technology and how does it relate to the DlB? 
What are DoD's goals and objectives concerning dual-use technology? 
How can dual -use teclmology be applied to the CIA? 
What arc the advanlages of dual-use teelmology to the CIB? 
What are the disadvantages of dual-use technology to the CIS? 
n, SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASS UMPTION 
j, Scope 
The Army's usc of dual-usc tcchnology in acquisition programs mentioned earlier 
in th is chapter provides evidence thai dual-use is successful in accomplishing a lower unit 
cost, quicker fielding availability and viabil ity for the wnlractor. The Army and DoD 
must make efforts to develop dual-use capability in all sectors of the DID. This thests 
discusses how the application of dual-use technology in the production of CDE in the 
em can sustain the base 
r his thesis reviews dual-use technology policy and how it has been implemented 
in other areas of the 000. rhe thesis draws on these experiences to addresses dual-use 
application to the em. 
2, Limitations and Assumptions 
rhis research is limited 10 the CDE section of producers in thc DlB The 
researcher assumes: (I) the reader has a general knowledge of the OIB, ClB and dual-
use teclmology, (2) that policies regarding dual-usc are valid, and (3) there are no current 
applications of dual-use technology in the ClB. Another limitation of doing research on 
the potential for applying dual-usc to the elB is that the term "dual-use" is relatively new 
to 000. To date no research has been done on the application of dual-usc to the Defense 
Industrial Base 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The basis for this rescarch is current literature. regulations. acquisition documents. 
and interviews. The data collected from the il1lerviews arc prcsented in Chapter IV . 
F. ORGANIZATI ON OF TH E STUUY 
Chapter I presented the introduction with thc basic research questions. scope. 
limitations and assumptions. 
Chapter II presents backgro und infomlalion on thc DIB. CIB and DoD's policy on 
dual-usc technology. This chapter also provides a description of some of the programs 
the Government uses for investments in tcehnology. Additionally. the methods available 
to capture and maintain critical technology and processes will also be discussed 
Chapter III describes the methodology for conducti ng Ihe resean.:h ami Ihe 
background for (he interview 
Chapter IV provides the findings and rt:sults. This chapter also discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of applyi ng dual-usc tcdUlology to thc cm. 
Chapter V addresses conclusions and recommendations on dual-usc teclUlology 
and sustainment of the CI B This chapter also providcs recommendcd arcas for further 
study. 

II. BACKGRO UND AND LITERATURE R EVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Thi~ chapter defines and discusses the Defense Technology Industrial Base) 
(OTlI3). it ~ history makeup, problems and deteriorat ion . It also discusses the Chemical 
Industrial Base, and its make up. reasons fur ils existence and why dual-use is applicable. 
Additionally, this chapler defines and discusses dual-use technology and DoD policy 
regarding technology developed for defense purposes thaI can also be used in commercial 
markets_ This chapter further discusses any implementation of dual-usc efforts thus far 
within DoD related to the sustaimnent of the DTiR 
8. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL RASE 
1. Definition 
A General Accounting Office (GAO) report 011 the Defense Industrial Base 
defines the defense technology industrial base as: 
The combination of people, institutions, tedmological know-how, and 
fa cHities used to design, develop, manufacture, and maintain the weapons 
and supporting defense equipml:nt nel:ded to meet U.S. national security 
objectives This hase has tluee broad components research and 
development, production, and maintenance and repair, each of which 
incl udes public and private sector employed faci lities. (GAO, 1993, p. I) 
2. History 
lbe dcfensl: industrial base was initially dl:s igned to support the nation in the 
event of a global waf simi lar to World War II, the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam 
Contlict. Thesl: were war~ of extended time periods. (Thomas, 1992. p. J) The support 
required for the nation's armed for(;es for re(;ent crises and events such as Grenada and 
Operation Desert Stonn (ODS) have not been the of the same extended nature and did not 
require the same 01B support. These recent crises required the action of quick response 
forces. Typically, quick response forc es respond to events of limited duration. The 
DTlB requirements m:eded to supp0l1 an extended duration war rather than a short 
duration war are notably different. (Thomas, 1992, p. 3) This difference was 
demonstrated in the war with Iraq 
The war with Iraq provided eviden(;e that even though the industrial sto(;ks of the 
nation were readily available, there still may be some difficulty providing the support 
needed for short duration wars. (Thomas, 1992, p. 3) Many ODS after-action reports 
(AAR) highlighted difficulties that was encountered by industrial base producers to meet 
surge capacity. The surge capacity of a defense producer refers to: 
fhe ability of the defense industry to expand military production in a 
"peacetime" situation, and without a formal declaration of a national 
emergency The tenn is usual ly used in the context of a rapid increase 
in the production of key combat items in response to an emergency falling 
short of a declared war. Since the elements of surge are operating in a 
peacetime si tuation. defense production would be carried on for the most 
part by existing contractors. (poner. 1992, p. 4) 
The difficulties noted in ODS resulted because it was difficult for contracts to be awarded 
and for contractors to establish production lines in a timely manner. Time is required for 
contractors to SCI up their production lines and ramp up the production to their surge 
capacities in time to meet the requirements of a short lived confiict like ODS. 
3. Compm·ition of the ba.~e 
Mr. Jacques Gansler is a well respected lind noted expert on the DlB Mr. Gansler 
Affording Defense, 1989, describes the defense industry a~ being composed of three 
dimensions. He describes these dimensions as 
10 
In one dimension, the large prime contractors or v.eapon suppliers 
(nonnally known as "the defense contractors") are at the top, the second 
li er is made lip of the major subcontractors (many of whom manufacture 
electronic devices, such as computers and radars), and the lowest tier is 
made of the suppl iers of parts and material. It is in these lowest tiers (the 
level of the semiconductor producers, the metals' fabricators, etc.) Ihat a 
great deal of commonality exists between the defense industry and the rest 
of the economy . This is often referred to as the "dual-usc" tier ollhc 
de/ense industry , and emphasis should be placed on the desirability of 
increasing the usc of commercial firms for ddense work at this level 
The second dimension is made up of the numerous distinct sectors 
of the defense industry (aerospace, shipbuilding, munitions. so on), 
there are dramatic differences between these sectors--for example. 
building ships is somewhat like building houses (i .e., one-by-onc 
production process), while making bullets is a mass-production operation . 
Therefore, the Department of Defense should deal differt:ntly with each 
sector, and the incentives for the various sectors should di ffer 
correspondingly 
The third dimension shows that the defense industry has a mixture of 
private ov.llersh ip, and publ ic oWllership, varying significalllly from sector 
to sector Again, this difference should be recogniud by thl: DoD when 
it is dealing with any defense finn or sector... (Gansler, 1989, p. 239-
240) 
V rhcse dimensions arc imponant because they provide a framework of what the 
~IB is comprised of and where oppol1unities for dual-use exisl. The dimensions Gansler 
speaks of comprise the physical makeup of the DIB. This makeup, according to Gansler, 
is one of the reasons for some of the problems now being experienced in the D18. These 
problems include the decline of defense contracts and of contractors entering into the 
defense market. This decline is coupled with the inability of contractors in the base, 
despite advanced Illobi]j".ation planning, to adl:quately suppan Ihc nation' s wartime 
needs. The industrial base could cease to exist if DoD does not change the way it does 
business with the producl:rs and suppliers in the base. (Gausler, 1989, p. 240) The DoD 
way of doing business has been that all procurements must be competit ive. This strong 
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preference for wmpetition discouraged establishment of long term customer-supplier 
relationships. 
4. Problenu 
Another rcason the defense industrial base is facing trouble may be due to the 
false ideas generated by the agencies4 rcsponsible for monitoring and assessing the health 
of thc base . These agencies felt that the economics of supply and demand will bring the 
defense industry into balance. This scenario is unlikely because the Defense Department 
is not a truc market. The Defense Department exists or functions in what is called by 
many economists as a "monosponsy" In a monosponsy , there is only one buyer of 
(;ovenunent equipment, supplies, and services hut there are many potential suppliers. 
This monosponsy situation has caused some firms to become solely reliant on the 
Defense Departmcnt as their source of revenue 
The Defcnsc Department now realizes that in order to rcsolvc thc problems of 
dependency caused hy this situation, the 000 must ch.mge the ways in which it does 
business with defense contractors. The traditional dcfense contractor will be forced to 
capturc whatevcr share of the commercial market it can in order to he self-sustaining. 
Thc Government must now face the rcalization that they too will have to either acccpt or 
modify thc products available in the commercial market place to suit their needs. This is 
a 180 degree differcnee from the current mentality in the Government. This mentality is 
to design and develop defense-unique items to meet thcse nceds. The business as usual 
attitude can be no more. (Gansler, 1989, p. 243) 
In 1988, the DoD's concern about the health and viability of the industrial base 
prompted it 10 task thc Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to conduct a study of thc 
base. The objective of this study was to detennine what industries were most important 
• "DoD ,dcnlif",d severa l Government agencies that h,,·o an impomllli role in identifyi ng 01l<"I m3.inl3ining (he def= 
industrial ba.sc; Do D. the Department' of Energy, Inlerior. Comme,ce. and the Tre ... ,ulj'. the Federnl Emerge,,/:)" 
Management Agency (F f- MAl and IhcOrr.ccoflhc U.S. Trade Representative. (GAO, 1988, p. 3)" 
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to thc DTIB The LMJ study wa~ to be a ' Iuick assessment of the industr i e~ important to 
the DTIB. The study also focused on determining why the prodm:tion capaci ty and 
productivity of the base were decrea~ing The LMI study conducted the assessment 01 
the industrial base using six economic indicators. These indicators were 
Import share of domestic market. 
C, ro\.\·th in capaci ty 
Growth in shipment 
Capital expenditure a~ express~d as a ra tio to industry shipments, 
Productivity in growth, and 
Profita hility (GAO. 1988. p. 22) 
These indi cators chosen by Uvfl were considered by the personnel conducting the study 
to be reasonable measures of perfonnance that provide the information required by DoD. 
(GAO. 1988. p. 6) 
The LMI study results ident ified 215 industries as being important to the DTIB , 
and found that there were some characteristics that existed among commercial industries 
in general that were also important to the DTlA. In general, industries important to the 
DIA were able to maintain a share of the U.S. market in their area of expertise. These 
commercial industr ies exhibited characteristics such as less than average gro\\1h, 
productivity, and investments in facilities and equipment. (GAO. 19KR, p. 15) Because 
the study was conducted in such a quick fashion, its results were questioned by Congress 
and prompted a GAO review. (GAO, \988, p. 1) 
The GAO conducted a review of the study done by J.MI later in 1988. The GAO 
review was to look at what act ions 000 had taken to ident ify industries important to 
defense and what percentage of DeD contracts were being awarded to foreign contractors. 
(GAO, 1988, p. I) 
The GAO review of the LMI study focused on four important areas: 
Identifying the federal agencies that play a significant role in 
maintaining the dcfense industrial base and strengthening industries 
deemed critical to national security, 
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Summarizing these agencies' efforts to identify defense-critical 
industries, 
Detennining the agencies' actions and proposals to enhance or 
maintaiTl the viability of defense-critical industries 
Ohtaining DoD's and other agencies' views regarding selected 
industries. (GAO. 1988, p. I) 
The GAO criticized the LMI study for inadequately defining a defense-critical 
industry. (GAO. 198R, p. 5) The GAO further criticized the LMI study for not 
considering the defense industries' "research and development (R&D) budget growth and 
international market share" as mcasurcs of pcrfonnance. LM] personnel that (;onducted 
the study agreed with GAO in this respect and stated that due to the insufficient tillle 
allocated for the study they did not consider all measures of perfonnance. Based on 
GAO's comments, the 000 wneluded that the methodology used by LMI needed some 
refinement in order to accurately portray the problems (dcscribed above as study 
characteristics) in each sectOr of the industrial base. The DoD further detcnnined that an 
analysis of each sector of the industrial base should ~ done. This final detennination for 
assessments in each particular sector of the DTIB led to a number of follow-on 
evaluations. (GAO, 1988, p. 18 ) 
The LMI study was only thc tip of the iceberg. More rescart;h and studies were 
conducted on the health of the industrial base and what was needed to revive the base, In 
fact. research conducted in a 1992 study on the "Extinction of the Industrial Base" 
provided a vision of the industrial hase of the future. (Thomas, 1992, p. 4) This study 
revealed that the mission-tai lored-forces supported by the DTIB is one of the reasons the 
hasc must change. The Office of Tcdmology Assessment (OTA) which is the analytical 
ann of Congress, also conducted a study on the DTIB. The OTA study re\'caled a set of 
characteristics that may likely he possessed by the future forces of the nation. Table 11 
shows these unique charactcristics. Thc characteristics are important because they show 
that thc changes in the forces and the supporting infrastructure arc so closely related that 
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ch:lIlges in one have a tremendous impact on the other. (U.S. Congress, 1991, p. 484-
4 85) 
TABLE II ; T raits of Future Defense Forces and the supporting Industrial Base 
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Soule. lJ.S. Congress. I Iou,". 1991 . P 4~4 · 48S 
The definition of the OTIB clearly takes into account that the industrial base 
encompasses more than j ust production and support . Technology is a very crucial, if 110t 
one of the most important elements orthe industrial base. The importance of technology 
has grown more since the fall of the Berlin Wall. (Gansler. 1989, p. 241 ) This new focus 
on technology has pushed DoD into a s it uat ion where decisions involving unaffordable 
tradeotl"s were being made. An example of such a tradeoff involves a decision by 0 00 to 
spend more money procuri ng a systcm because of the tcclUlology it oflered. This focus 
for the lates t te(;hnology drives the decision toward designing a new system that 
incorporates th is state-of~the-art technology. This method of ~ystem acquisition is 
preferred to conducting thorough market research that would permit procurement of a 
commercial system that is readi ly available and incorporates this technology. (Gansler. 
1989_ p. 241) Because of such tradeoffs . the ability of the DoD to provide the necessary 
funds to buy and suppon the teciUlology needed to maintain a viable industrial base is 
now questionable. 
The ability of 000 to acquire the necessary funds have been shown in several 
repons and studies. These repons and studies indicate that 
The President's fiscal year 1993 budget called fo r a $50 billion reduction 
in U. S. defense budget authority over the next 5 years and deeper cuts arc 
expected from the new administration. (GAO, 1993, p. 1) 
This trend has abo been reflected in the Presidents fi s(;al year 1994 budget 
request. In his 1994 budget, the President req uested : 
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Budget authority of $2634 billion f(lr the National Defense budgct 
function for fiscal year 1')94 The c(lmrnittee recommends an overa ll 
level ofS262.8 billion in hudget <lulhority. This amount is <I reduction of 
approximately $60 million from the amount requested by the President 
(U.S . Congress, 1994, p. 2) 
rhis decrease in the defense budge! authority is repeated in the FY 1995 budget. 
In his 1995 budget, the President requested "S263 .7 hi Ilion for National Defense" the 
budget aUlhority for FY 1995 was decreased by $900 million. (U.S. Congress, 1995, p 
2) 
These trcnds serve as indicators pointing to decline of the industrial basc and loss 
of its capability to support the nation's national security needs. This decline is further 
evidenced by the fact that the commercial industries in the defense sector [lre no longer 
the leaders in advanced technology . (Allison, 1992, p. 125) Grah[lm Allison, the author 
of"Rethinking America's Security" discusses how defense industries that were once the 
leaders in technology innovation in the early I 950s grew comfortable and complacent 
with this lead and lost foc us on the commercial requirements necessary \0 maintain the 
technological innovation. Their loss of focus also caused the U.S. to lose focus on the 
commercial requirements necessary to maintain their technologi(al irulOvation. This lost 
focus resulted in the U.S . eommerci<ll industries allowing their imernationa) counterparts 
to gain the lead in technological innovation. This pia(ed the U.s. in a po~ition well 
behind in some key technological areas such as those depicted in Table Ill. In addition to 
being behind, the U.S. has totally lost its footho ld in other key technology are<\S to their 
international counterparts The areas that the U.S. has lost are listed in Table IV 
(Allison, 1992, p. 125-128) 
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T ABLE III: Techllologies in which the Ullitcd State.~ is WEA K 
H,,!> f ,~ """"""' ) P,,~-... 0. .... " 
F"."_,, 
fABLE IV: Technologies in which the United States Is Losing Hadly or Has Lost 
M,I,,,'';prw.. ,,, s",,,", 
0,..". 1 I.fcnn."on " .< 
~";:,,~ ~,::~;~:~;:~~::,~~I'" 
President Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS) indicales the importance of 
technology 10 a nation's competitive edge that is gained through its investment in 
technology will have a definite impact on the national security of the nation. The Clinton 
Administration clearly supports the need for the nation 10 be strong in technology and 
maintain a strong economy. mi litary and a strong intemational political position. (The 
While House, 1994, p_ 5) 
The U.S., in spite of its weaknesses and losses in some key h::-chnologieal areas, 
still maintains strength in its technology base. This strength results from the 
technological lead our commercial industry has gained over the defense industry. (U.S. 
Congress, 1991. p. 45) 
The lead attained by the commercial industry is due to declines in the DoD budget 
and the ability of the commercial industries to capture a portion of Ihe international 
market. The desire to attain a share of the international market forced commercial 
industries to devote large investments to their research and development programs to gain 
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advanced technologies at reasonablc cost. The commercial market is proiit driven 
whcreas the defense markct is performance driven. The advan(;ed technology being 
dcveloped in the commercial market is being done without any investment support from 
the Govemment. This independent development does not givc the Goverrunent access to 
this technology nor any influcnec over how this technology is used (Defense Scienec 
Board. 1990. p. 3-1) 
5. Rea!ioll.fjorpmblems 
The 1)00 is losing its ability to managc thc industrial base that supports the 
nation's peace and war time operations. This loss occurred because of the laws, rules and 
regulations that reljuire compliance by defensc contractors, which are rcstrictive. These 
measures. combined with the declines in the defense budget all have an impact on the 
health of the industrial base. Thesc impacts have different effects dcpending on the size of 
the contractor and the sector of the industrial base in which he provides support. 
(Gansler, 1989, p. 241) Large defcnse WnlIac\orS like Gencral Dynamics and Lockheed 
are in a better position to retain their defensc business viability because they are at the top 
level or dimension of the dcfense industry. (Gansler, 1989, p. 239) 
Typically, large contractors scparate their defense operations from their 
commercial operations. This is primarily due to the strict rules, regulations and 
recordkeeping requiremcnts placcd on contractor's doing business with DoD. Small 
businesses usually cannol afford to separate their dcfensc and commercial contract 
etforts. This forces them to focus on defense only or commcrcial only efforts. If they 
choose defense they usually are providing industrial ba~e support in an area that is DoD 
spe(;ific. Oftcn, thc goods and services provided by small businesses to DoD have little 
or no commercial application. (National Defense, 1993, p. 9) 
This la(;k of commercial use also applies to largc 1)00 contractors. TIlc Dc:fcnse 
Department has actively taken part in measures to help sustain the larger contractor 
simply beca\l~e of his part in the production of major weapon ~ystcms. These measures 
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inc1ud~ providi ng for teaming ventures among l<lrg~ defeme contractors. These ventures 
have the appearance of "skirting the laws that al low mergers and <lcqulsit ions among the 
Imgc corporations." (Ganslcr. 1989, p. 258) 
In the past. li tt le attention has been givcn to the lower tier contractor. Evcn 
though, the lower tier contractor may prov ide the hulk of the contmct requi rc ments. In 
some instances these lower tit:r contractors m"y be supplying 60 to 80 perct:nt of the parts 
and materiab in support of tht: large contractor. Much of the expertise and the capability 
of the advanccd tcchnology lies with the lower tier contractors. This is because the 
smalier, lower level contractors are ablc to concentratc their efTorts in a specific area and 
beeome experts in this tec1mology. This spccialization docs not pennit the small 
companies to segregate thcir defense and commercial business. This lost opportunity 
increases the rel iance on DoD fo r their business base and viability. (Gansler, 1989, p. 
25 8) 
The Ddense Department' s lack of action for sustaining lower tier contractors has 
probably bcen a mistake. Tbe mistake is made because little consideration is givcn to the 
significant role played by lower ticr contractors in meeting the defense needs. The 
rationale that has been used hy 000 has probably been that if DoD takes cart: of thc large 
defense contractors thesc contractors will take care of their lower tit:r contractors. While 
it may have been done in some instances, the majority of large dcft:nse contractors, in this 
time of reductions, are unahle to help anyone unti l they fi rst hel p thelnselves. (GaIlSler, 
1989, p. 258) 
Unfortunately, this situation will only worsen as the defense purse shrinks. Thc 
shrinking defense purse will also shrink opportunities for tht: lowcr tier contractors as the 
largc contractors become less inclined to subcontract work that they need 10 keep people 
employed or factori es open. (Gansler, 1989, p. 258) 
The importance of lower tier contractors and their competit iveness was somewhat 
addressed in a GAO report on 'The Adequacy of Information on the Industrial Base." 
The GAO concluded that the lower tier contmetors will likely bear Ihe bnmt of the 
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decline in indu:mial competitiveness. The GAO also found that the management of the 
industrial hase by thc 000 has been less than optimal due to the lack of a database 
management system (DAMS). Thl: DBMS is a computerized system that allows 
personnel 10 collect data and compile a database that can be used to managl: filts. records. 
stocks. elc. A DBMS permits 000 an opportunity to maintain the "pulse"" of the 
industr ial hase stocks. The report stated that it is virtually impossihle for DoD or any 
other agency with some responsibility for mainl<lining thl: health of the industrial hase to 
access this information in one consolidated area. (GAO. 1990. p. 2) 
If the health of thl: industrial base is going to improve. 000 must make changes 
to the way il conducts busi ncss with all defense contractors. The current acquisition 
refonn and Ihe preferences for perfonnance and commercial specifications rather than the 
military specifications are a step in the right direction. All contractors that provide 
subcontractor support to 000 will become more important with the use of pcrfonnance 
and commercial specifications because of the importance of subcontractors support in the 
industrial base 
B. CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL BASE 
1. Background 
rhe fall of the Berlin Wall in conj unction with the demise of the Soviet Union. 
along with the dismantling of their chemical and nudear weapons arsenal causeil some 
kcy players in the Defense Department and Congress to question whether there wa~ a 
need for any continued support of limited offensive or defensive Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical (NBC) support for the nation's anned forces. The invasion of Kuwait by 
Suddanl Hussein and the fear that some of the Soviet Union ' s arsenal of chemical 
weapons could be used by a dictatorial ruler who had used these agents against the people 
of his nation. quickly dispelled this douht. The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and Pre!!ident 
Clinton's NSS dearly indicates that the protection of the nation's unned forces against 
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these weapons of mass des truction is a national securi ty objective. (The White House. 
1994, p. 33) 
Since the fall of the Sov iet Union the U.S. has changed its doctrine and t<lcties. 
The BUR and the Clinton NSS state that the nation will probably be involved in eonlliets 
wi th much small er countries. With these small er countries there wit! be little or no 
wfl rning and the U,S, armed forces must be prepared to respond to nearly simultaneous 
major regional contingencies (MRC). (Office of Secretary of Defense, 1993, p. 10) The 
projections are that these conflicts will most likely involve Third World countries. In 
light of the Gulf W<lr, it is likely that the u .S. amlCd forces will be involved in both 
peacekeeping and counter-telTorism operations 
A review of the Gulf \Var requirements for chemical defellsivl: support by the 
House Armed Services Comm ittee (HASC) determined that the likelihoorl of the U.S . 
military involvement in a chemical or hiological attack has dramatically increased. This 
increase occulTl:d because the fall of the Soviet empire provided a false sense of securi ty 
that a ll of our worries eOlleeming weapons of mass destruct ion had been put to rest. No 
one ever envisioned a small third world country like Iraq would dare to strike out against 
the mighty Americans or any of its allies. The Gul f War made this a reality and thereby 
increased the likelihoorl of chemical and biological threats to the U,S. (U.S. Congress, 
1993 , p. 338) The defensive support for U.S, armed forces against nuclear, hiological 
and chemical (NBC) thrl:ats is provided by the elB. 
2. Definition, make-up und composition 
The Chemical Industrial Base is one of the major sectors of the Defense 
Teclmology Industrial Base. Thi s sector produee~ defensive chemical equipment and 
supplies required to support the U.S. armed forces in the evelll of all offensive chemical 
attack. This sector of the DTIB is comprised of approximately 40 contractors domestic 
and foreign. Table V provides a listing of the chemical industrial base contractors and the 
erilical chemical defensive equipment (eDE) tcelmology area the contractor supports. 
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TABLE V; Chemicalindustriaillase Contractor's and Critical Technologies 
Interest in h::chnology has heightened world wide. This is primarily because many 
countries realize the potential for cost savings and benefits (i.e., short fielding times) that 
advanced technology offers. This world wide ur glubal interest in advanced technology 
ha~ also made it easier for terrorists to get their hands on the technological know-how to 
make weapons of mass destruction. The NBC defense community has continually 
referred tu chemical and biological weapons as the '·poor man's nuke." This means that 
chemical and biological weapons do nOl necessarily require advanced technology to 
manufacture, yet they possess a destructive JXIwer on a scale similar to nuclear weapons. 
To make chemical or biulogical weaJXIns a producer would only require access to a 
facility that manufactured pesticides and fertilizers. The realization of the putential for a 
facility to be uscd for more than one manufacturing product is probable. (McIlvaine, 
1994, p. 33) 
The increased threat from weapons of mass destruction sparked Congress tu 
initiate a ~pecial investigation to determine what improvements were needed to expand 
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th.: support capacity wi thin the U.S. Chem ical and Biological Defensive program to 
counter possihle terrorist altacks. (U. S. Congress, 1993 , p. 340-341) 
The DoD in a 1993 report to Congress on the industrial base identified a "need to 
maintain a warm industrial base for mobilizat ion surge" r he report referred to CDE 
itcms that wcre critical to the W[l r needs and as such were obtained with additional 
appropriations. The ' -war stoppers" were items identified in a study on the industrial base 
hy the Defense Logisti!.: Agency (DLA)_ The DLA study determined two specific items 
of CDE as bcing in danger_ These items wefe the chemical protective suit, commonly 
referred to as the battle dress overgarment (BOO) and the chem ical protective gloves 
These items were singled out primarily due to the instability of production and thc lack of 
producers. (U .S . Congress, 1993. p. 342) 
Following the Gulf War, the House Anned Scrvices Committee (BASC) stated 
that the probabili ty of an NBC attack is sti!! very real. The HASC detennined that it is 
important that the U.S. have the capabi lity to protect and sustain its soldiers at a level 
that will allow them to continue to operate even during tbreat of an N BC attack, They 
further determined that the best way fo r the U,S, to counter su!.:h a threat was to establish 
a !.:hemi!.:al defense program that will allow Ihe U.S. to build-up their planning for 
contingcncy missions l'his planning includes "training, detection and prote!.:tivc 
equipment and mcdical prophylaxis, therapy and casualty care_" (U.S. Congress, 1993, 
p. 340) 
The HASC has given tremendous accolades to the U.S. chemical defensive 
programs efforts during ODS hut slated th<lt this rcviscd program will concentrate more 
on thc fo llowing areas: 
(l ) Research, development, and acquis ition - Research, development and 
acquisition programs for chcmical and hiological detcctors, protective 
equipment, and medical prophylaxis and treatment must be better 
integrated and coordinated among U.S. armed forces and with U.S _ allies. 
(2) Management - The Department of Defense necds to strengthen the role 
of the Army as cxccutive agent for thc chcmical-biological dcfcnsc 
progrdlll and provided the Army the fun ding and the authority to execute 
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this mission_ The Army must be held responsihle for managing the entire 
program for all the services. and the other services must be held 
accountable for following the Army's direction. Joint service coordination 
of the program must be improved and executive oversight of the program 
by the Oftice of the Secretary of Defense should be increased_ The role of 
the deputy Assistant to the 'Seeretary of Defense (Chemical Matters) as 
foca l point for the entire ehemical ·biological defenses program (including 
both physical and medical defense programs) should he strengthened, and 
this office perform more detailed oversight of the program and participate 
to a greater degree in its development f he committee recommends 
placing the entire Chemical-Biological Defense Program under Defense 
Acquisition Board oversight 
0) Training 
(a) Institutional traini ng - Training of U.S. chemical-biological defense 
specialists for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines should be 
consolidated at the Army's Chemical SchooL Further expansion of 
cooperative training programs with U.s. allies at the Chemical School 
should be considered . The United States should offer these facilities and 
other facilities associated with the chemical demilitarization program for 
the training of Chemical Weapons Convention inspectors. 
(b) Unit training - Unit training standards for ehemical--biological defense 
must become an integral part of wlit training requirements. Unit 
proficiency, readiness, and capability for combat operations under the 
threat of chemical or biological attack should be cvaluatcd using realistic 
scenarios in exercise at majur tmining fac ilities and the National and loint 
Training Centers. 
(4) Readiness - The military services and major commanders in the field 
currently lack a means of tracking the state of unit readiness and training 
in chemical-biological defense. Unit proficiency in chemical and 
biological defense must become an integral part of readiness evaluation 
and reporting for all U.S. armed forces. 
(5) Emergency plaIUling - The potential for [dual-use] of commercial 
chemical facilities by a chemical weapons program and of civilian 
pharmaceutical and medical research and production faeilitie~ by a 
biolugical weapons program, the relalive case with which undeclared 
stocks and covert production or transport may be concealed, and the 
efforts nations will take to protect sensitive defense and proprietary 
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commcrci<li information demand continuing t:mphasis by the U.S. 
intelligence commun ity on active intelligence programs for dt:Lection and 
moni toring of chemical and biological weapons programs. (U .S. 
Congress, 1993, pp. 34 1-342) 
The HASC" s awareness of the importance of the chemical defensive posture of 
the U.S. armed forces is evidenced by their actions to reemphasize the designation of the 
lead agency for chemical defensive matters. (U.S. Congress, 1993. p. 340) 
Section 11 01 of tht: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 
(N OAA), states' 
The Anny [is] the executive agent for Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Defense Programs. Th is section would provide for designation of the 
Army as DoD executive agent for research. development, and acquisition 
for the chemical and biological warfare program, reflection of that 
designation in the defense budget, and oversight by the Defense 
Acquisition Board. (U.S. Congress, 1993, p. 342) 
This designation was accompanied by the transfer uf funds from the Navy and Air Force 
accounts to designated Army accounts specifically related to chemical and biological 
defense weapons. The I-IASC also recommended that the Army establish a chemical-
biological defense program that would gain more support from the international 
conununity, The committee required that approximately S 10.6 million of appropriated 
funds be transferred from Navy ,md Air force program elements in research and 
development. (U.S . Congress, 199], p. 113) Another indication of the imponance of the 
chemical defense of the armed forces is the authorization and appropriation of the dollars 
for this equipment. The Other Procurement, Army (OPA) authorization and 
appropriation of CDE are sho'.'.'Il in Figure 2-1. 
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS 
OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY 
OtherSupf)OrtEquipm"nt 
Ch .. mic~ 1 O"t.ns;V9 Equip",. nt 
SIMP COLL PROT EQUIP M20 
COLL PROT EQUIP NBG TEMPER. TENT M2 
MAS~ , PROTECTIVE, NBC M40n.A42 
REMOTE SENSING CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM, XM2t 
I~MPROYED CHEMICAL AGENT MONITOH RECONNAISSANCF SYSTEM, FORX NEIC (NBGRS) XM DECONTAMINATE APP ~ DR LT WI M17 
AADtATION MONITORING SYSTI:'M (OPA-3) 





F.gure 2 I. Ch.mltal D.rcn.,v . Eqll.pment Author.zlll.on/ApprOlmatmns 
SOlute; U.S, Cong ress, 1993, p, 3~ 
3. Critical technology 
(111,926 
.0 
The technologies presentt:d in Tabk V were deemed critical in a study conducted 
by the U,S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM). (CBDCOM 
Study, 1994, pp. D-l-D-19) The criticality of tedlllology depends on various factors. In 
a different study conducted by the Defense Science Board in 1990, the criterion fo r a 
defining critical technology was established a~ the following: 
Critical Technology: candidate technologies must meet all of the 
following criteria: 
Provide a significant leap forward in warfighting advantage (in both 
quality and quantity) 
Have a high entry barr,icr (no rcasonabk substitutes) 
Have a relatively long transfer time to controlled countries (greater 
than three ycar~)_ (Defense Science Board, 1990, p. 2-20) 
The nature of the equipment and supplies produced by the chemical industrial 
base meet the n:quirements of this definition. The protection and survivability of soldiers 
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for extended operations in war pruvides the significant leap fOr\vard in quality and 
quantity meets the warfighting advamage requin::rm:nt In some instances, there are no 
"reasonable" substi tutes for the equipment provided by the producers in the chemical 
indu!)triul base_ There are no commercial products available to provide the level of 
protection afforded by the equipment and supplies provided by the producers in the 
chemical indust ri al hase. Final ly, there are nuclear explosivc export conlrob to conlrol 
thc transfer ofnuckar materials. [t is likely that similar controls apply to the tcdUlology, 
the equipment and supplics produced by the producers in the chemical industrial basco 
(GAO, April 1994, p. 2) 
Tn 1994, the Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) tasked the CBDCOM to conduct 
a study on the cm. The CBDCOM study was conducttcl to respond to a Joint Logistic 
Commanders tasking. This tasking was provided as a result of an earlier industrial base 
stud}' conducted by the Headquarters (HQ), U.S. Anny Annament, Munitions and 
Chemical Command (AMCCOM)_ This AMCCOM study required a more dctailed 
assessment be conducted to assess the health of the chemical sector of the industrial base 
and identity any areas that may require special attention. (CRDCOM, 1994, p. I) The 
segmentation of the chemical industrial base was also documented in the early industrial 
basc scctor study conducted by AMCCOM . (CBDCOM, 1994, p. 15 ) This AMCCOM 
sector study was the back bone of the CBnCOM study. It providcd a framework for the 
cRncor ... l study. 
The CBDCOM study detennincd how thc chemical industrial base can meet the 
requirements for all four services up to the year 2000. The study considered the impacts 
of the Defense Department's draw-do\vns and budgct declines ill making its a"sessment 
of the ability of the base 10 provide support. 
r ile study was a joint effort, conducted by the Anny, Navy, Air Force and 
Marines, that assessed the hcalth of the CIB. The assessment was conducted for 
equipment already in use in the Held, equipment in development, as well as chemically 
rela ted medical itl:ms. Thl: purposc of the study was to: 
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Identify thosc stcps necessary to 
Sustain critical elements of the industrial base; 
Consolidate future requiremcnts to assist the future industrial base; and 
Plan for replacemcnt of out-of-date stockage 
rhe CUDCOM study states the Chemical Biological Defcnse (CBD) sector is ' 
a fragmented collection of subsectors. The commercial tinns making up 
thc production base are generally small to mid-size companies, and range 
from low to high-tech production processes. They range from specialty 
chcmicals (decontamination materials and dctector kits) to rubber molding 
(masks, glovcs and boots) to microelectronics (automatic sensors and 
monitoring deviccs) to spccialty textiles (protcctive suits). (CADCOM. 
1994,p.15) 
rhe study confinned the make up of the chemical industrial base to be that of 
primarily small businesses with specialized functions in thc critical chemical technology 
areas listed in Table V. Thc continued decline in the defense budget willlikcly make the 
problem conditions, such as segmentation of the hase and the high level of spccialization 
that already exist in the hase, worse. 
It also revealed a problem in thc chcmical industrial base due to the lack of a lead 
agency to managc chcmical issues for all the services. This problem still existed in spite 
of the NDAA of 1994 previous designation of the Anny as the lead agcncy. The problem 
existed because each scn-ice failed to acknowledge this designation and continued to 
procure and manage their requiremcnts in whatever manncr they deemed appropriate, 
which was suboptimization of Ihe contractor and supplier assests available to servicc the 
base. Additionally, the CBDCOM study provided Ihe M21 RSCAAL that is procured by 
both the Am,y and the Marine Corps from the same producer as an example of thesc 
suboptimizations within each of Ihe four Services. Thc suboptimization resulted in 
unproductive guidance from the lead agency (i.e., Anny). (CBDCOM, 1994. p. 15) 
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Finally, the CBDCOM study slaled that 000 can no longer continue to do 
busines~ as usual. In order fo r the chemical industrial base to n:main viable and the 
contmetors to n:main profitable, DoD must look for new and effecti ve ways to sustain the 
base 
C . OUAI..-lJSE TECHNOLOGY 
1. Definition 
One means to sustain the chemical industrial base and provide viability for the 
contractors within the base would be to appl y the concept of dual-use technology. The 
dual-use of technology is defined as 
. technology that has an indeterminate number of potential uses, at least 
some of which are of signifielml military importance and some arc of 
material nonmilitary importance. (Branscomb, 1990, p. 37) 
A more comprehensive definition of dual -use includes 
Commercial off· the-shelf (COTS) - Identical item used for both 
commercial and military applications, produced on the same 
production linc 
Modified COTS used for military application and produccd on the 
same production line as the commercial item 
Differcnt end items for military and eommcreial applications that use 
the same piece parts, modules and/or suhsystem components, ideally 
produced on the same production line. (Mcilvaine, 1994, p. 32) 
Dual-use technology encompasses "everything" that results in the design and 
production of a major weapon system and its commercial counterpart. It includes the 
in[onnation scientific, theoretical and mathematical procedures used in this development 
and production process, no matter how common or uncommon they may seem. (Epstein, 
1989, p. 4) 
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1. The need for dua/-uj'l! 
In 1991, Congress chanered a 000 Advisory Pane l on Streamlining and 
Codifying Acquisition Law. This Panel was established by Subsection 8UO of Public 
Law 101-510 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991. The Panel was to 
review the acquisition laws and regulations and identify areas for elimination and 
streamlining. This panel gained the name of "the Section 800 Panel." The Panel had 
three of their ten objectives related to the Government's new orientation toward what 
they temled a "build-down." The "build-down" referrcd to the changing defensc budget 
:md the move toward the dual-use of technology and preferences for commercial items 
(000 Advisory Panel, \993, p. 5) 
The Panel coined the term "build-do\VTl" to refer to the defense draw-do .... n, Thc 
Panel reemphasizcd that the 000 management of the industrial basc must change in order 
for the base to remain stable. The Panel suggcsted that this new orientation could 
increase the surgc capacity of the producers in the base. This increased capacity will 
allow the producers to reduce their operating cust and overhead by spreading this cost 
over a larger base. (000 Advisory Panel, 1993, p. 13) 
The 000 dual-use stratcgy statcs that thc nccd for dual-usc arises from changes in 
the focus of the national sccurity objectives of the nation. These changes ineludc the 
commercial n:search and development (R&D) outpacing 000 R&D investments. The 
000 strategy states that "defense-unique" procurements wiH be used only when the 
nation's national security objectives are at risk. (U .S. Depanmcm ufDefense, 1995, p. 2) 
The move by DoD toward using what is available in the commercial market versus 
developing defense-unique itcms is a step toward dual-use 
3, Toward dual-u.se 
In an efTon to explore the conccpt of dual-use technology and maintain thc 
technology edge for defense, the Congress established the Advanced Rescarch Projccts 
Agency (ARPA) in 1958 after the Russians launched a "Sputnik satellite." The agency 
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was to investigllte and monitor the "development of high-risk technology _" The agency's 
name wa~ laler changed 10 Defense Advanced Resean:h Projects Agen(;y (DARPA) to 
reflect an oricnti:ltion toward technology developments bcncficial to the Defense 
Department. The purpose for establishing ARPA was to open the door for defense to 
gain access to thc lates t and greatest in technological advances made in research and 
development. (Davey. 1993. p. I ) Wilh the development of the dual-use of technology 
concept, ARPA is the DoD focal point for dual-use technology 
The esti:lblishmcnt of ARPA has provided many opportunities for commercia l 
businesses to "spin-off' of the tcclmological advam;es made in the military sector that are 
dual-usc. It has also afforded opportunities for "spin-on"' from the commerc ial sector to 
defense. One of the significant a(;complishmcnts of ARPA was their involvcment in 
development of the local area network (LAN) systems which has grown to what we now 
know as the internet. In addition to this accomplishment, ARPA has extensive 
involvement in the arcas of "artificia l intelligence and parallel processing for 
supercomputers," (Davey, 1993, p. 2) 
The agency mainl y serves i:lS the investment funding conduit for laboratories, 
uni versities, commercial finns and the defense department for conducting research and 
development in high-risk teclmological areas. The duration of funding for an ARPA 
project is limited to detennine whether or nO! the teclmology will provide any bencfits 
useful for defense. (Davey, 1993, p. 2) 
The ARPA R&D budget has taken the opposite direction from that of DoD. 
Instcad of decreasing the ARPA R&D budget has increased in "constant dollars." This 
increase occurs during a period when the DoD R&D budget has deelined continually 
from fiscal years (FY) 1988 to 1993. During this period, the DoD research, dcvelopment, 
test and evaluation (RDT&E) budget "decreased 13 percent in constant dollars while 
ARPA's budge! doubled." (Davey, 1993, p. 5) The FY 1994 budget language for ARPA 
provided funding authorizations for dual-usc c ritical technology partnerships, 
commercial-mi litary integration partnerships and defense dual·use assistance extensions 
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for $105, $35 and $50 million, respectively. It also ineluded a strong recommendation 
that a program be established to provide "defense divcrsification loan guarantees for 
small and medium-sized defense companies wishing to diversify or convert. (U.S. 
Congress, 1993, pp. 349-.150) This fundi ng profi le shows a change in the 000 mindset 
to forge beneficial rather than adversial relationships with the commcrcial industry 
In January 1992 000 rcviscd its acquisition strategy fo r all 000 agencies 
requiring more emphasis on advances of the agencies in science and tcchnology (S&T). 
This increased cmphasis provided more 000 oversight in ARPA's technological 
programs. However, it is believcd that somehow this additional 000 oversight will 
inhihit ARPA' s ability to capitalize on the technological benefits gaincd from the 
research and development efforts. (Davey, 1993, p. 3) 
\Vhi lc the DoD's change in focus toward the dual-use conccpt is only the 
beginning, there are numerous issues that must bc resolved with regard to the dual-use of 
technology. Another issue is the restrictions on which technologies can exploit their 
dual-use applicability. This is a key qucstion that 0 00 must tackle because the dual-usc 
of some technology will have a bearing on the national sccurity objectives. (Wang, 1987, 
p. 22) This is probably why some have referred to dual-usc technology as a "gray area" 
meaning that no clear boundaries exist to separate where the uses and benefits of 
technology for the military and civilian arcna start and end. (Wang, 1987, p. 21) 
Because of this ambiguity there are other dUlll-use issues that DoD must resolve to gain 
the maximum bencfits dual-use has to oiler. 
4, Dual-use iuue.~ 
The applicability of dual-usc has becn a long standing issue in the mind of some 
defense and congressional leaders since early 1989 when thc concept of dual-use was first 
introduced on {he scene. "{be "applicability" of dual-use means that the technology and 
the production methods are common and require minima! changes to produce a military 
and commercia! item on the sanIC production line. This interest in dual-usc sparked many 
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studies and investigations by congressional and ddense leaders. The main concern of 
thes~ leaders was how the combination of the scparated defense and commercial 
productioll li nes of industrial hasc prouul:ers could take place in spite of the prohlems 
inherent in the prowrernent and acquisition laws and regulations. These inllerent 
probkms of combining commercial and defense prouudion lines was the objective of a 
slUdy b) a Steering Committee of the Center for Strategjl: and International Studies 
(C SIS). The CSI S study was headed by a panel of notables HInging from senators to 
dual-use and industrial prod\.Ktion and manufacturing experts. This committee was 
chartered to study the obstacles to commingling the defense and commercial production 
li nes and efforts of defense contractors. (Opsta\, 1991, p. vii) 
The CSIS study's foundation was based on previons studies of the industrial base 
and the challenges that face the Congress and the Department of Ddense as they try to 
salvage the capabilities within the base and keep it viable and responsive to the needs of 
the nation while simultaneously providing a means of profitahility for the defense firms 
in .... olved. (Opstal, 1991, IX) The Committee further referred to "integration:' which they 
detined to mean that DoD "would rely more on l:ommef(;ial products, processes, and 
buying practices.'" It also meant that a lot of industries within the defense industrial base 
could use the same technologies, people, procedures, and buildings, that they usc for their 
commercial operations for the defense operations. This idea of integrating both of these 
operations has been under investigation for guite some tirnt":. The general findings 
indicate that such an operation could potentially save the contractors, Doll, and the 
American taxpayers quite a bit of money. To date only limited tests of such an 
application have taken place and the results of cost savings vary and are program 
dependent. (Opstal, 1991, p. ix) 
The csrs based their reasoning for adopting a program objective of integration 
based on three assumptions 
Syngeries between defense and commercial product and process 
technologies exist and will increase in the future 
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Greater reliance on commercial products and processes will result in 
cost savings to 000 for equipment of cqual or grcater quality and 
performance 
The nation's military necds-both in peacetime procurement and crisis 
surge demand can only be affordably assured hy tapping into a broadly 
hased domestic industrial infrastmeture. (Opstal, 1991. p. 2) 
As previously stated, many defense contractors segregate their defense business 
from their commercial because of the eumhcrsome standards required to be a 
Government contractor. These rcgulatory and legal requirements are not free, they add 
substantial cost to the products and services provided for the Defense Department. (000 
Advisory Panel, 1993, p. 5) 
The CSIS study concluded that the segregation of defense and conunercial 
production efforts is no longer required. The study states that this is due in part to the 
similarities and common uses in the commercial market for what were once defense 
specific products. This is also due to the technological competitiveness gained by the 
commercial sector over the past decade. (Opstal, 1991, p. 3) 
The cost for this segregation, if not discontinued, is likely to grow right along 
with the costs for advanced technologies. Thc CSlS study cstimates the burdens of the 
legal and regulatory provisions combined with the segregation increase the costs because 
they require the contractor to perform extra work. For example, the study sites that 
contractors have to hire additional employees speciflcally to complete the requirements of 
the Government cost accounting procedures. Additionally, more personnel and man-
hours are expended when the commercial firm undergoes an audit from the various 
Government audit agencies. The CSIS committee concluded that activities such as these 
(i.e., audits) do not add valuc. Instead, they detract from the value and sometimes cause 
CQmmerciai finns to avoid doing business with the Government. These non-value added 
requirements have also been known to force contractors to dissolve their Government 
sections or divisions. (Opstai, 1991, p. 5) 
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The need for dual -usc has also revealed th;!! the lI::d l11oiogical advan(cs made by 
the commercial sector haw out paced the Government for morc than two decades in 
various markets. The Government still retains a lead over the commercial sector in the 
aerospace: industry and :;atell ites; however, there is growing interest in these areas from 
foreig n Governments. A survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
revealed that the Japanese and U.S. Govcnuncnts are equal in several high tcclmology 
research and development areas. (U,S. Department of Commerce, 1990, p. 9) The five 
arcas of emerging teclmologies5 in which the Japane~e are ahead of the U.S . are depicted 
below in Figure 2-2. 
; , 
Source: u.s D"partment orcommerc. , 19'KI. p. xviii 
Some countries rccognized thc importance of pooling their rcsources with their 
industry countcrparts. They rcalized that this effort would not only improve th~ 
competitiveness of the industry but it would also improve the cconomic competiti"~n~ss 
of the nation. The Japanese and European Govemments are currently using th~ conccpt 
of dual-usc and merging their commercial and defense resources to achieve thl: optimal 
solutions for their nations. (Reddy. 1991, p. 74) The U.S. Government must also rl:alizc 
thc importance of the coop~rat ion that must occur betwecn th~ privatc and publ ic scctor if 
the nat ion's industrial basc is going to survive 
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5. DoD dual-use policy 
Thl;.': Clinton Administration strongly suppons dual-use initiatives. This is 
I;.':vidl;.':neeu by the defense strategy on dual-ust': technology and also by the establislmlt':nt 
of the current technology reinvestment and tht': defense conversion programs at ARPA 
As usual. the Congressional suppon for a program is usually reflected by the allocation of 
appropriation dollars. The ARPA fiscal 1995 spending plan for $ 2.X billion includes 
SI.81O $ 2 billion for dual-use progranls. (Evers, 1994, p. 56) In May 1995, ARPA 
issued a joint program solicitation noliet': in tht': commt':rce business daily for the 
Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP). The solicitation was for S300 million for 
teeMology investments in sevt':ral areas. Somt': of thest': areas art':· 
Cryogenic Coolers for Electronic System Applications 
Electric and Hybrid Tactical and Commt':rcial Vehicles 
Low Cost Specialty Metals Processing 
Millimeter Wave Products for Military and Civilian Applications (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1995, p. I) 
The proposals from industry are due hy the end of June 1995 with negotiations sct for 
October 1995. Although tht': TRP is a wd1-intended program, the solicitation strongly 
urges hidders that their TRP concept papers must contain substantial scientific/technical 
merit. The It':ehnical merit has been designated as the most imponant t':valuation factor 
but, Iht':ir papers still stand the chance for rejection if they do not meet tht': test of 
n:levancy of the technology to the det(:nst': needs. The solicitation also notes that "TRP is 
a Defense program [and that] proposals that do not prt:sent a compelling Defense hcndit 
\vill not ht': funded." I"his could recreate the problem that UoD is currently trying to 
remedy, avoiding defense-unique items. (U.s. Department of Defense, 1995, p.l) 
The 000 policy on dual-use technology is that dual-usc is: 
A key component of DoD's invt':stment stratt':gy for maintaining the 
{)t':rfonnance superiority and Affordability of U.S. military forces in this 
new technological and economic environment. It builds upon the 
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successful 000 acquisition refom] effort Elements of dual-use 
technology investment strategy servc to: (I) ensurc that key elements of 
the domestic commercial technology base that are critical for national 
security remain at the leading edge: (2) support the transitioning of 
defcnse~sponsored tcchnology and the integration of military production 
with the commercial base; and (3) facilitate insertion of commercial 
teclrnologies into military systems. Thc benefits for the 000 will be better 
products--developed faster and at a lower cost--and a vigorous, productive, 
and competitive commcrcial industrial infrastructure which. when coupled 
to the superior systcms integration capability and defensc-unique 
technologies provided by defense contractors, will ensure a superior U.S 
mi litary. (U,S. Department of Defense, 1995, p. I ) 
This policy is based on "Three Pi llars" with 
Acquisition refonn as a foundation, are SUppol1ing a change in the 000 
defcnsc-unique "culture" that will pemlit 000 to maintain state-of-the-art 
pcrfonmmce and affordabi lity in military systems. 
Pillar 1 - dual use technology investment in R&D on dual~use 
technologies 
Pillar 2 - "dual-produce" integration of military into commcrcial 
production 
Pillar 3 - insertion of commercial capabilities into military systems 
(U .S. Dcpartment of Defcnse, 1995, pp, 7, 17. 23) 
This policy reveals that 000 recognizes the potential dual~use offers for defense 
(Le., lower acquisition cost, earlier fielding) as well as the benefits for the commercial 
customer, stronger more reliable business basc. These potential benefi ts clear the way for 
success in implementing dual~use within 000. 
6. Dual~use succe.u 
In addition to policy issues on the dual-use of technology, the practical application 
of this concept applied to a weapon system acquisition would be beneficiaL Perhaps the 
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most successful application of dual-use is the non-developmental acquisition of the 
Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS is a' 
dual, mili tary and civilian use system. It provides standard positioning 
service (SPS) for civilian users who gain access to the system using 
commercial available receivers. For L'.S. military and selected allies. The 
Precise Positioning Service (PPS) is avai lable via the incorporation of 
embedded encryption algoritiuns .... (Sweeney, 1993, p. 39) 
In 1990 the ArnlY had an ongoing development for GPS systems since 1976, with each 
system estimated to cost more than $40.000. The initial requirements projected hy the 
Army were around 900 systems. The arrival of ODS quickly ch~mger.l the situation and 
necessitated the accelerated development and production of the system. The system that 
was under development at the time was the ANIPSN-8. This system weighed 
approximately 17 pounds and could be carried by vehicle. However, the initial estimated 
cost of $40,000 had now hallooned to around $ 2 bi llion to acquire the because of the 
need to huy 60,000 total systems. The quick fix for ODS was for the Army to acquire 
8,000 lightweight GPS commercial receivers ruggedized for military use. These 
receivers weighed only 4.1 pounds and the estimated cost for this small lightweight GPS 
receiver (SLGR) was estimated to be about $4,000 each. (Sweeney, 1993, p. 39) 
This switch to a nondevelopmental type of acquisition for a commercial-off-the-
shelf item (COTS) required tradeoff on some requirements since the Non-developmental 
Item (NOl) configuration would not match the performance requirements of the original 
AN/PSN-8 . TYpically, NOI systems require some modifications. The extent of these 
modifications can alter the system so much that it may not meet the requirements of the 
operational requirements document (ORO). The Government involvement of the user 
early on in this process was key to the success of the program. The program encountered 
numerous legal battles and set legal precedence in NOI acquisition strategy. The courts 
detennined that 
The Government, under an NOI acquisition, (·an properly acquire a system 
which may not exist at the time of project initiation. The courts stipulat(.'·d 
that Government use of an NOI strategy was permissible if the system was 
38 
10 be othenvi~c in production at the time of Govcllunent !.:Ontract award. 
(Sweeney, 1993 , p. 40) 
The success of this dUil l-usc effort clearly demonstrates that dual-use ean work for 
the Government. The kcy is communication and coordination between all the key players 
in the process and a wcll thought out plan. 
l b is chapter presented background infomlation and a literature reviews necessary 
for the reader to understand the DTIB, cm the concept of and dual-usc technology. The 
sustainment of the OTiB and CIB are important for the supply and Sllppoll of the U.S 
armed forces in national emergencies. The OTIB was initially estahlished to provide 
long term war support. BUI overtime with advancements in weapon systems and 
technology used in war this industrial hase support has also changed 
Technology is impollant to the CIB because it will provide the leverage necessary 
to attract new produccrs to thc base and sustain the currcnt produccrs. The DoD ,md 
other agencies within the Govertunent have acknowledged thc importance of advanced 
technology to small husinesses in the DTIB. This acknowledgment is accomplished 
through the programs under the auspices of ARPA such as TRP. 
The dual-usc tcchnology concept otters the potcntial for sustainment of the CIB. 
It also offers the potemial benefit for lowering the production and start-up costs and a 
means to att ract new producers and stabili7.e the currem producers. The dual-usc of 
technology concept also provides a method to keep a continuous industrial basc 
production linc nirming at all times. With all the potential for henefits from dual-usc 
there is onc important drawback that meri ts further investigation. The dual-use of the 
technology of defense weapon systems poses a national security risk because capabilities 
and limitations of these systems will be known by all 
The next chapter provides the methodology used to conduct this research. 
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III. RESEARCH M ETHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
fhe firs! two chapters of th is thesis described the existent prublems in the defense 
industrial base and the ,hemicaJ industrial base . These prohlems arc mainly due to the 
specialized production capability and the nalUre uflhe products <md services produced by 
the chemical industrial base unique to defense. This is also due to the number of 
prooucers from the commercial sector available in the base with a capability to support 
the chemical defensive m::eds of the nation. The growing deficit places more empha"is on 
the ability of the defense department to sustain a chemical industrial hase that is 
technologically capable to support wartime ncrds. (U.S. Congress, 1993. p. 338) 
The DoD and other detense agencies have made attempts to use some fonn of 
dual-usc techno logy This concept of the dual -use of \I;::chnology is the Defense 
Department's first real attempt to try to resolve some of the dependency of defense 
contractors on the Government. It is also an attempt by some defense contractors to 
actually market their products and services to customers other than the Government. 
As stated in the previous chapters, the application of dual-use technology to the 
chemical industrial hase cou ld potentially allow producers to improve their ability to 
succeed in the commercial sector rhe improved contractor potential provides the 
technological edge needed of the industrial base for national emergencies and 
contingencies, 
The researcher generally believes that some [onn of the dual-use of chemical 
defensive equipment technology is feasible. The researcher questions if there is interest 
in the corrunercial market for the products and services produced by the chemical 
industrial base. 
This chapter describes the methodology used to conduct the research to obtain 
opinions regarding the applicabil ity of dual-use to the chemical industrial base and the 
potential benetits_ These opinions were obtained through interviews with Government 
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ami Defense contractors who are involved in the DTIB, and thc chemical industrial base 
or any area of dual-use technology. Specifically, this chapter discusses the 
Method of data collection 
Construction ufthe interview questions 
Interview length 
Selection of interview respondcnts or interviewees 
Conduct of the interview 
B. DATACOLLECnONMETHOD 
In dctennining the method and level of detail to use in this research, thc researcher 
used the dendritic analysis techniques. The dendritic analysis techniques arc defined as: 
An effective way of decomposing critical issues to the point where actual 
data requirements and test measurements can be identified ... issues are 
successively broken down into objectives, measures of effectiveness 
(MOE), measures of perfonnance (MOP) and data 
requirements ... measures of effectiveness arc developed as subsets of the 
objectives and are designed to treat specific and addressable parts of the 
objectivt:s. Each MOE, is traceable as a direct contributor \0 ont: objective 
and through it, is identifiable as a direct contributor to addressing one or 
more critical issues. (DSMC, 1993, p. 14-7) 
The dual-use dendritic approach is presented in Figure 3-\. The figure is 
composed of the primary and subsidiary research questions. The questions were broken 
dU\l,'Il into more details until a data source or data element could be identified for 
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The use of demographic information is also important in the interview process 
This information usually provides the researcher with information on the cultural and 
educational perspective of the respondents The interview questions and demographic 
section are at Appendix A. 
I. Telephone interviews 
The questions were asked by phone in the same maImer as if the interview were 
being conducted fac·e-lo-face. (Sudman, 1983, p. 267) The research on conducting 
interviews suggests that in order to illllke telephone interviews more beneficial the use of 
Iwo interviews should be used. The researcher used a two-step approach. The first skp 
of the interview was to establish initial contact. For this research, the first interview was 
used to request the respondent's participation and gain agreement to conduct the 
interview. It was also used to obtain the infonDation necessary to provide an advance 
copy of the interview questions (i.e., fax numbers). The second step of the interview was 
used to conduct the actulll interview. (Sudman, 1983, p. 272) 
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The n::searcher initially establishcd a two-wcck period to conduct and completc all 
interviews. Besides this two week period, the researcher allowed additional f1exihility to 
extend the schedule depending on the availabi lity of the interview respondents. The final 
frame used to conduct the interviews was 26 April 1995 through 28 May 1995. The time 
length for conducting an interview was 20-30 minutes. 
Interviews were conducted with the experts in 000 and the commercial sector 
The limited time and resources available to the interviewer allowed interviews to be 
conducted with five current chemical industrial base producers. The focus of the 
interviews was to detennine their perspective on dual-usc of the technology prevalent in 
the hase and its llpplicability . The researcher selected the telephone interview rather than 
surveys or questionnaires because of time constraints 
2. Question construction 
The thoughts and feelings of a person can be best attained by asking open-ended 
questions. (Patton, 1990, p. 278) The "standard open-ended interview" question is· 
A set of questions carefully worded and lUTanged with the intention of 
taking cach rcspondent through the same sequence and asking each 
respondent the same qucstions v.ith essentially the same words .. .The 
standardized open-ended interview is used when it is important to 
minimize variation in the questions posed to interviewees. (Panon, 1990, 
p.280-281) 
The characteristics of and the strengths and weaknesses of the standardized open-ended 
interview are provided in Tahle VI. 
TABLE VI: Characteristics of the Standardized Open-ended Interview 
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In deciding to conduct telephone interviews, the development of the interview 
ques tions was an important issue. Stanley L. Payne, author of The Art of Asking 
Questions, states that 
Question wording involves more than loying around with Ihis word and 
that to see what may happen, however, It is more than a mere matter of 
manipulation of words to produce suprising illusions. The most critical 
need for attention to wording to make sure that the particular issue that the 
questioner has in mind is the particular issue on which the respondent 
gives his answer. (Payne, 195\. p_ 9) 
I'lle questions and their wording were extremely important to cnsun: that desired 
reSJXlnses were received. ~,1r. Payne also states thaI the interviewer, in urder to assure 
that the issue he or she is trying to obtain answers 10, must be som~what if not thoroughly 
und~rstood by the respond~llt. Mr. Payne further states this assuranc~ is a direct function 
of the wording of the interview questions, (Payne, 1951, p. 10) This had an impact on 
the design and selection ofth~ inkrview questions d~vdoped by the res~archer. 
rhe usc of d~mographie informatiun is also imporuUlt in the interview process 
This infommtion usually provides the researcher with information on the cultural and 
educational perspective of the respond~nts . The i ntervi~w questions and d~mographic 
section are al Appendix A. 
fhe research~r cunsidered Ihe iniomlalion desired to be coUected and chose the 
open-ended questions. The open-ended question was selected over the closed-end 
question because the researcher wanted to allow room for the interview responuents6 to 
elaborate mure freely on their opinions about the research issue. 
3. Procedures for selection of respondents 
Thc procedures used to detcnnine which persolluel would bc selected for the 
interview were important to the conduct of this research. These procedures were based 
primarily on invoJv~ment and expertise ufthe personnel in the area of research (i.e., dual-
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use technology, chemical industrial base. and defense industrial base). The researcher 
expected difficulty in selecting individuals who met these requirements and, abo 
possessed an interest in conducting the interview. This anticipated difficulty was 
encountered in only one instance. In this instance the researcher selected an interview 
respondent that mt:! the requirements but was reluctant to conduct the interview. The 
researcher requested the respondent recommend another individual with similar 
experience with a willingness to conduct the interview. The interview participant's 
agency and the agency's involvement or expertise in the areas of research were also 
considered. During the literature review and background research, the researcher noted 
individuals and agencies with involvement in dual-use technology, the defense industrial 
base, or the chemical industrial base. The CBDCOM study was also used as a source for 
interview points of contact. Additionally, contacts from prior job experiences were used 
to obtain possible interview respondents. 
4. Conduct of interview 
Each agency selected for interview was contacted by telephone and requested to 
provide a participant for the interview. The agency reviewed the list of questions and 
selected the individuals with experience in one or more of the areas listed above. In the 
selection of the Uoverrunent personnel, the Program Manager (PM), DepUlY. Program 
Manager (DPM) or supervisor detennined whom the designated individual would he. In 
the selection of non-Govenunent personnel and defense contractors, the company 
President or Marketing Manager detennined who the respondent would be. The 
designated participant was provided a copy of the interview questions and introductory 
letter by fax. The introductory letter and interview questions at Appendix A were 
provided to each participant at least four days before the interview. The introductory 
interview letter was provided to interview participants to establish a minimum baseline 
for the subsequent interview. This haseline was a simplistic definition and example of 
dual-use technology. A simplistic definition was provided primarily because the 
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researcher assumed each participant had some kllowlcdgc of dual-usc technology , 
chem ical defense equipment, and the make-up of the chemical industrial base. 
Considering Ihis assumption, the researcher's millima] definitions weTe used to delennine 
the validi ty of this assumption. Confirmation of the receipt of the interview questions 
was by phone. The time between faxing of the introductory letter, interview questions, 
and scheduling allowed the participants time to review the questions and focus on the 
answers they planned to provide 
The interviewer was consistent throughout each interview. This consistency was 
obtained by reading the questions verbatim as shown in Appendix A. Iflhe interviewee 
provided responses that were too general. the interviewer asked if the interviewee to 
elaborate on that particular area. If the respondent indi(;ated he or she was pressed for 
time, the interviewer's goal was 10 wmplete the interview first and upon (;omplelion of 
the interview to revisit any areas that needed <ldditional clarification. 
Interviews were scheduled and conducted at the date and time scheduled. This 
time was according to the (;onvenience and availability of the participant. The various 
time zones in which the interviews would be conducted required close coordination to 
ensure that time differences did not interfere with the scheduling of the interviews. 
The researcher infonned all participants in the introductory letter that the 
anonymity of the responses of each pani(;ipant was assured due to the combination of 
their responses with the responses of all other interviewees. The researcher started each 
interview with a brief introduct ion of herself. This introduction wa~ followed with 
notiticatiotl to the interview participant that lhe interview was being recorded only for the 
purpose of enriching the data gathering process. The researcher concluded the interview 
by thanking respondents for their time and participation in the interview 
5. Data ana[ys~' 
For this research, the researcher determined the best way to analyze the data 
would be to first transcribe each interview tap onto an interview fOnTI . After this v.ras 
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compkted, the responses to each question were consolidated by interview respondent. 
The researcher did not make any summaries, inferences or inkrpretations about what an 
interview respondent meant by an answer. The researcher compiled all responses to each 
question. This compilation of resJXlnses permitted a thorough review to annotate any 
repeated responses. The researcher also reviewed the compiled responses for topics 
frequently mentioned among respondents. In addition to the areas most mentioned. the 
researcher reviewed the responses to detennine if any pattern exiskd among the 
respondents. Following this review. the compikd responses were further reviewed to 
determine the perceptions that existed among the interview population about dual-use and 
theClB 
rhe researcher used the CRDCOM study as a starting point to indicate the 
problems such as the lack of an established method to sustain the ClB in the face of 
dov.llsizing. The CBDCOM study provided assessments on the cm production 
capability as well as the availability of the producers in the cm that were used for this 
research. 
The interview questions asked respondents to provide ideas on who, what, when, 
where. and how regarding dual·use and the cm. Interviews were conducted with experts 
in the DTIR. cm and the dual-use technology concept. 
The next chapter will present the findings and analysis of the interviews. 
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IV. FINDINGS ANI) ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The dual-use of technology in th~ chemical industrial base can provide nwnerous 
benefits for the Government as well as defense contractors. The research indicates that 
the previolls 000 paradigms did not promote the dual-usc of tl:chnoJogy. rhese 
paradigms relate to the defense procurement system and the legal and regulatory 
requirements. During this research it was surprising thai only a few of the interview 
participants were aware of or mentioned the changes being made in the acquisition 
process. 
The refamls in the acquisition process relax some of the requirements for 
documentation in 000 contracting and alleviate the use of military specifications. The 
changes concerning the dual-use of technology are the DoD preferences for NOI, COTS 
and wmmercial specifications 
The researcher used interviews to obtain the perceptions of Government, academia 
and defense contractors concerning the applicability of dual-use technology as a mcans 
for sustaining the CIB. This chapter presents and discusses the results of thl: interviews 
conducted to suppon this research. 
B. OVERVIEW 
A total of 19 interviews was completed during the period of24 Apri l 1995 to 28 May 
1995. Several other organizations and individuals were slated to be interviewed; 
however, thl: researcher was unable to successfully make contact prior to the cut-ofl date 
of 28 May 1995. The individuals that were contacted were very interested in 
participating in the interviews 
The researcher used a two-step interview process. The two-step process allowed 
the interview respondents an opportunity to review the quest ions and think over their 
responses prior to the interview. In some instances the intervil:w respondents had writtl:n 
out their responses and read their responses to each question during the interview. The 
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interviewer initially planned for the interviews 10 last approximately 20 to 30 minutes in 
duration. The average interview time was approximately 30 to 35 minutes at the start of 
the interview process on 24 April 1995. The time had averaged out to be approximately 
15 to 20 minutes by the end of the process. The researcher attributes this time difference 
to learning interview procedures and experience gained over time. During this 24-day 
period, the researcher learned how to administer interviews and answer questions about 
the interview questions without prejudicing the respondents' answers. As the researcher 
conducted more interviews and gained more experience, the effects of inexperience with 
the interview process became minimal. 
I, Demographics 
The interviews collected demographic infonnation on the respondents. The 
demographic infonnation detennined the average experience of personnel in the dual-use 
of technology and the industrial base issues. ThefC were three categories of interview 
respondents. The first category included i3 Govemment personnel. The highest grade 
level among Government personnel was General Services (GS)-IS . The lowest grade 
levcl was GS- I I. Among the second category. defense contractors, the highest level of 
personnel interviewed was vice-president. The lov,'est level was the director or 
coordinator of a division or branch within the company. The last category induded one 
academic interview respondent who was a fuJI professor at an ivy 1eague university with 
an extensive background working dual-use technology as well as industrial base issues. 
The overall average years of experience working dual-use technology issues was 
11.15 years . The average years of Government experience. among the personnel 
interviewed was 20.82 years. Finally. the average number of years in their current job 
position was five years 
TIle demographics revealed that non-Government respondellts each had some 
previous experience with the Government. This meant that the rcspondents werc aware 
of the Government way of doing business. All the interview respondents wurked in the 
so 
Eastern United States. These locat ions rangcd from iloston, Massachusetts to 
Washington. D.C 
The resulb and the overall comments provided in responsc to each interview 
questiofl have been consolidated and the combined analysis of each is prcsented in this 
chapter. 
2. Has your agency , corporation, institution used dual-use technology? 
The research revcals that therc has been limitcd use of the dual-use tcchnology 
.:oncept by 000 agencies, defense contractors, and academia. This question was 
answen::d affimlatively by approximately 74 percent of the interview population. lbe 
range of areas in which the dual-usc te.:hnology con.:ept was currently lx:ing used are 
Development of drug therapies 
Non-developmental itcms and commcr.:ial-off-the-shclf items 
Military detection deviccs for hazardous industrial chemical materials 
Military productinn facilities (Government Owned Contractor Operated 
(GOCO» 
Cooperative Research and Development Agrecments 7 
Filtration 
Infrared technology 
The range of areas provided by the interview respondents appeared to show a trend or 
pattern. This pattern seemed to be linked to the amolUlt of experience and expenise the 
interview respondent had in the areas of dual-usc and the CIB . For example, among 
respondents with tive years or more experience working dual-use tcchnology issues, 47 
percent rcsponded affirmatively and supported their responses v.ith examples. Only 21 
percent of the rcspondents with less than five years experience in dual-usc issues 
, i\ Coopcrativ~ R&D i\grccm~nl is an arrant""""nt by wnicn both industry and the Ann)" COlI benefi t by wurking 
together on a prublem of mutual ;nleres\. Industry gain< acc,,, 10 tht Army'S qualifi~d scient;'" and engine=, 
valuable palents and 1echnic .1 d.la_ and compu,", soft ..... ar • . The industrial par1 [\er can oxclu,i,·.ly exploit th<. 
r~su lting intoll.clual proporty for commcrcial purpose,. while Ihe Gov~mmem retains a lic~ns, for i" lISe. The 
nalion benefils from a meng1henO<J indu,trial base ""d cnhanc~d glob,1 compcliti'·(ness. Thi, new program creates 
eXciling opportunilies for teIDlw"r' betw~~n indu.'lry OJld Army Rol f) urganiulio,,-,. coupkd to Ilattk 
L.bs ... (AnnyMaleriaI Cornmand. p.14) 
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responded affirmatively with specific examples, To contrast this with negative responses, 
there was zero negative responses from interview respondents with five years or more 
experiem;e in dual-use. While there was twenty-one percent negative responses from 
interview respondents with less than five years experience, reveals that a response pattern 
is developing. This denotes that additional information would be required for further 
evaluation of this area. 
One interview respondent stated that the dual-use technology concept also applies 
to the dual-use of the facility. Thc intervicws revealed that an attempt by one contractor 
to attain dual-use of his facility gained no interest or support from 000. The producer 
presented an idea to 000 related to a method that could be used to help chemical 
producers and other small businesses retain their business and market viability. The 
producer offered DoD a trade to retain the production capability for chemical industrial 
base items. The interview respondent stated that in re turn, 000 was requested to buy 
products produced for commercial sales by the contractor. The Defense Department was 
reluctant to participate in this business venturc. The respondent further stated that DoD 
did not provide rationale for this decision. 
J. Do you know of any other agency that has used dua/-u.fe technoLogy? 
The results among the entire interview population were that there is some 
knowledge on the dual-use of technology by agencies within and outside 000. The 
agencies within 000 are listed in Figure 4-1 and agencies outside of 000 arc shown in 
Figure 4-2. 
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command 
(CBDCOM) 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 
U.S. Anny Communications and Electronics Command 
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Department of Energy 
Departmcnt of Commercc 
National Aeronautical Spacc Administration 
Departmcnt of Agriculturc 
ri~u .. 4_2 ,\gencit. 'lUlside DoD thai us. Dual·us. Terhnolol:)' 
rht: knowledge outside the defense sector was limited to a basic knowledge on the 
concept of dual-ust:. Approximatdy 70 percent of the personnel interviewed knt:w what 
the tenn "dual-usc tcc!mology" mcant and kncw of agcncies that were using thc concept. 
The awareness was somewhat limited on the specialized cquipmcnt produced in the 
chemical industrial base. Although 70 percent of the persOimel interviewed were 
knowledgeahle ahout dual-use, of that 70 percent, approximately five percent were less 
knowledgeable;: about chemical defensive cquipment. Although tht: intervicw population 
was aware of dual-usc, thc CUITt:nt applications of dual-use in other areas of thc em and 
the 011B pcmlits tht: n::searcher to conclude that dual-use can be applied to other sectors 
of the DTiH. The intcrvicw rcspondcnts perceived that a more specific knowledge basis 
is rcquircd whcn you want to apply dual-use in a specific arca. 
1/_ Do you think the dua/-uu technology concept can be applied 10 defensive 
chemical equipment in the Chemical Industrial Base? Why? 
Sevcnty percent of the personnel intervicwed indicatcd that thc concept of dual-
use technology could be applicd to thc chcmical industrial base, the reasons thcy supplied 
varied among the interview respondents. The reasons ranged from "it is a good idca 
because of the budget cuts and downsizing," to "some of the chemical protective 
equipment used in defense can be used as safcty cquipment for industrial workers:-
Some other reasons for the applicability of dual-usc tt:chnology to the chemical industrial 
base are: 
Potential dollars saveU in ROT&E. These doBars can be used by private 
industry for othcr efforts. 000 would benefit from these savings by procuring 
off-the-shelf equipment at a lower cost. 
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The use of commercial te(;hnology would expand the logistical suppon by 
industry to 000 
Chemi(;allUiologieal detection can have many uses not associated with passive 
defense 
Most all technology can be applied to industrial safety because they l13ve 
similar base technologies 
Detect ing airborne vapors do not have to be military chemicals 
It is being done now by ARPA 
Table VII shows some of the areas the interview respondents felt dual -use technology 
(;ould provide bene/it 10 the C1B . 
TABLE VII: Areas Dual-use is applicable to the Chemical Industrial Base 
In general, the interview responses indi(;ated that the applicability of dual-usc is 
somewhat situation dependent. The interview respondents perceive dual-use as situation 
dependent because in the words of one respondent ·'the commercial market is nOI ready to 
pay military prices for some of these items." Another respondent slated that dual-use is 
situation dependent for colledive protection equipment (ePE) because '-no company can 
produce CPE at the system level in this business." Another respondent perceived that the 
dual-use application to CrE could only be done at the component level (i.e., CPE consists 
of components such as a motor, environmental control unit, etc.). Finally, one interview 
respondent perceived dual -use as being situation dependent due to the "unusual nature of 
chemicals." 
One respondent stated that his agency was doing more than dual-use of the 
technology as defined in this research. The interview respondent referred to thi s research 
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definit ion as the "purest fo rm" of dual-use, Considering this definition, the respondent 
stated that his agency was mostly involved in the dual-use of the manufacturing and 
production facilities, morc specifical ly ammunition plants These facilitie s are 
Government ovmed and Contractor operated (GOCO). In this instance, the agency has 
fo und considerable benefits from the dual-usc of the facility by the contractor. The 
respondent Slated Ihat the Government is able to maintain the facility for later uses in 
nat ional emergencies and contingencies at reduced or no cost to the Govenuncnt. The 
respondent also stated that the dual-use of the facility may require the Government 10 
absorb an extraordinary amount of cost if there is a catastrophe. In this instance the 
Government's most substantial cost would be in the areas of indemnifieation8 and 
fungab ilit/. There are two ways of dealing with fungabilil y and indemnification. These 
ways arc: (I) requiring the contractor to purchase liability insurll!Jce, or (2) the 
Government in its sovereign capacity is self-insured and offers indemnificat ion to the 
contractor for damages if there is an accident. The dual-use of the facility requires the 
Government and the contractor to make trade-offs. The tradeoffs of this issue will be 
situation dependent. For the Government, if the contractor is required to insure himself 
then there is a potential for increased item cost in the contract. But if the Government, as 
a sovereign, self-insures then there is also the potential for lower item contract cost. The 
Govenunent in this situation should conduct both cost and risk analysis to decide which 
is the best course of action. 
resp(}n.ibi li'ylOpay 
' Funga bd i,y i, 'h~ proxess ofidenlifying responsibility for (I"rnages iflhere is "" accid~nl or catastrophic occurrence 
aline (incO faciljty . Tni. lerm is "cry inll>"rtanl primarily because Ihe dual-use ofa production facility by the 
Government and contraclor simultaneously uncovers problems and difficul lies never beforc CIlcounlcre<t. II 
boeCOIlle,difficulllo esl.btish resp<l",;bil il} fordanlagc~if 'hese ground rule, are 1101 e'p!icilly laid OUI in SOme type 
ofagreem"llluptmm 
ss 
5. What is wrong with the production of defensive chemical equipment in the 
chemical i"du.~trial hase that co"fd he remedied by applying dual-u.~e techllOlogy? 
rhirty-two percent ufthe interview population voiced opinions on problems in the 
chemical industrial base that could be remedied by applying dual-use technology . The 
problems ranged from "a lack of standardization for the chemical defensive equipment 
among the four Services,'· to ·'the f~lUlty 000 procurement process." Thc problems in Ihe 
procurement process relate to the lack of 000 assistance in providing or promoting 
capital investment programs to hclp with start-up costs. 
In general, thc interview respondents stated that there are various problems 
aswciated with the production of defensive chemical e4uipment. Some of the~e 
prohlems are 
Small quantity buys that yield insufficient business involvement 
Large start-up costs 
Duplication of efforts and equipment belween thc services 
Unique nature of the chemical defensive equipment produced for the 
Government 
Chemical Industrial Base is made up of mainly small companies with 
insuffic ient production for smaller huys that wi!] result from budget 
reductions 
Capital investments are larger in comparison 10 benefits attained 
The Government acquisition and procurement process is the problem 
Retention of domestic producers is not a preference for DoD 
One respondent felt thaI thcre is a perception Ihat a smaller number of busincsses 
were involved in producing chemical defensivc equipment because of the stigma 
associated with producing chemical warfare items. Thc rcspondent ft:lt that this stigma 
combined with the small quantity buys wcre sufficicnt detractors big commercial 
companies that are looking for big dollar payoffs. The respondent further stated that 
some oflhe items produced in the elB are nut well known in the industrial community. 
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Qlle reSjXlndclll felt that the biggest production problem was stan-up cost. The 
respondent stated that it is vel").' costly to sct-up and use equipment soldy for the military. 
The respondent slaled that the Government should pay its indust rial partner to gear up 10 
build defe nse equipment. The respondent further stated that dual-use would lower the 
stan-up cost for the {iovernment because the equipment would already be in use for 
cumnJercial production 
A requirement of newcomers to business with the Government is an immense 
amOLUll of upfront capital investment. There are very few, if any, programs in the 
Government to help contractors meet this upfront capital investment. Besides advanced 
payment and guaranlcl:d loans thaI help o;;onlraclors oncl: they have obtainl:d a 
Govenuul:nt contract, no programs clUrently exist to help with start-up costs. Chapter II 
uis(;Usseu lhl: problems small businessl:s wnfront obtaining these start-up invl:slments. 
One interview respondent stated: 
DO\\-llsizing shrank DoD to a size that demonstrates how 
maintain a production base in a statl:. Dual-use or 
allows the overhead hurden to he This dual-use means we can 
have the facility in a layaway state at litlk or no cost to thl: Goverrunent. 
Dual-use of the facility allows commercial contractors to produce, use, 
maintain, and rl:pair thl: facility. 
One respondent stated that 000 has 10 standardize similar CIE items belwl:en the 
Services. The respondent stated that he recognized that each Service has a Wlique 
mission but that there is too much duplication between the Services. Another respondent 
stated that more standardization of products would permit the lowering of overall costs 
aud that may be more attractive for new industries to do business with defense. 
Another respondent stated that if a piece of equipment ean be used as-is it 
probably would save 000 money, rather than having a requirement unique to defense. 
One respondent's perception was that there is nothing \\-Tong with the DTIE nor 
the elR, rather the problem is in the cumbersome (iovernment procurement process. TIle 
respondl:nt felt that this process forcl:s compliance with restrictive rules and regulations 
that deter contractors tram the desire to do husiness with the (ioverrum::nt. 
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The chemical defensive equipment required to support U.S. amled forces is not 
equipment u~ed on a daily basis. [t is required on an as needed basis and receives only the 
dollars requested in the 000 budget, unkss there is a specific chemical defensive 
program that is favored by Congress. 
6. If dual-u.w! technology is applied to the defensive chemical equipment in the 
chemical industrial ba.{e, should there be special procedure.{ or ilutructiomi on how, 
when and where to Uj'e the concept to em.·ure it is applied effectiwly? 
Forty-seven percent of the interview respondents felt that the usc uf special 
procedures and instructions should be situation dependent due to the special and unique: 
nature of the items produced in the chemical industrial base. Currently DoD has an 
immense amount ofrulcs and procedures that govern the acquisition process. These rulcs 
apply across the board regardless of the item being produced or the contractor producing 
the item. The Fedeml Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FA SA) changed some of 
these rules. The revised acquisition ruks focus on deleting any non-value added sleps 
from the process. The act emphasizc:~ a preference for NDI, COTS and commercial 
specifications, just to name a few 
One interview re~pondent stated that many defense-unique items have 
subcompunents similar to items in the commercial sector. The similarities make it easier 
to apply dual-use technology; however, the ease of dual-u~e application doe.~ not come 
without drawbacks. One respondent stated that the drawback of alluwing the dual-use of 
technology in the chemical industr ial base permits the technology to be available for all 
to usc. The respondent also kIt that thi~ availability will disclose no! only the strengths 
of the system but also its weaknesses. If these weaknesses arc known hy the general 
public, they will also become common knowledge to the enemy. Another interview 
respondent stated that the need for special procedures would be necessary to restrict this 
knowledge from the enemy. The enemy's knowledge of our system weaknesses poses a 
national security risk. In geneml, interview respondents felt that special procedures 
should be used on a case-by-case basis to dctemlinc the national security dueat posed by 
the dual-use of the technology. 
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One respondent thought spc6al procedures would also be helpful in identi fy ing 
the intellectual property rights of the infonnation, ideas. and materials resulting from a 
dual-usc production effort. One respondent's agency was involved in rt:solving the issue 
of the intellectual property rights of the Ciovernment and the contractor. A(;cording to the 
respondent, his agency would establish the intellectual property rights of the Government 
and the contractor in a memorandum of agreement (MOA). This method is currently 
being used by the agency in the dual-use of a facility. The agency uses a faci lity contract 
to layout responsibilities and liabilities of the Government and the contractor 
Forty-two percent of the respondents fe lt that the add ition of special procedures 
for the dual-use of technology would add to the already burdensome process of 
managcment rcquirements for Govcrnment oversight. 
One respondent statcd that dual-use is an arca that has many shades of gray. The 
grayncss results because on the one hand, thc Government would like to specify the 
technology that should be available fOf applications of dual-use_ But on thc other hand, if 
the Government continually tfies to dictate to the contractor "how" things should be done 
rather than promoting the "what" (i.e., dual-use of technology) the Government stands thc 
risk of losing contractors rather than attracting more contractors with state-of-thc-art 
technology into the DTIB. 
7. Of the chemical defensive equipment produced in the chemical industrial 
base, which lends itself more to the use of dual-use tec/mology? 
In general, the interview population felt that the chemical industrial base Meas 
that lend themselves most to the dual-use of technology would be limited to the areas of 
chemical, biological and radiological detection as well as the area of particulate 
filtration. 
One interview respondent stated that the application of dual-use to the equipment 
produced in the chemical industrial basc would be primarily at the subassembly level. 
The M48 particulate filter produced for the MIA! Abrams Tank is an example. The 
military carbon used to produce this filter is capable of handJing military and commercial 
chemical contaminants This means that dual-use could be beneficial because the carbon 
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used to produce the military tilters can also be used for producing the commercial filters. 
The respondent also stated that the carbon used currently for the commercial grade 
panieulate !ilter is a lower-level carbon and cheaper than the military-grade carbon used 
to make the M48 filter. The manufacturing processes for both the commercial and 
military-grade filters are similar; however, the respondent was not sure if the commercial 
grade carbon could meet the military requirements 
Another interview ft:spondent felt that the area of biological detection is also an 
area well suited for the dual-usc of technology. One interview respondent perceived that 
biological detection had the largest allocation of research and development funding in the 
current budget. The respondent stated that it is common knowledge that the authorization 
and appropriation of dollars by Congress clearly show the congressional importance of 
this area. Another respondent felt thai biological research for vaccines was another area 
with dual-use potential. The respondent cited that vaccines dcveJoped for the civilian 
sector can also be used for the military. 
One respondent slated that components such as ion material and rubber molding 
are used in the manufacture of individual protective masks. The respondent stated that 
the similarities in the usc of rubber molding and ion materials used in a variety of 
commercial applications could also lead to another dual-use opponunity. 
One respondent felt that with slight modification the detection equipment used by 
the Government can be used by thc wmmcrcial sector for monitoring and dctccting 
hazards in industrial operations. The respondent also felt that there were environmental 
hazards and pollutants that Government detection equipment could be used for. Another 
respondent felt that dual-use was applicable within the detection area. Speci/lcally, the 
passive infrared sensor area has tremendous dual-use potential. The system software 
would require some software adjustments and training would be required for separate 
applications. The passive infrared sensor area is one that can add value to Ihe commercial 
domain in magnetic resonance imaging (MRl). This technology is wrrently in use in thc 
U.S. Anny and Marine Corps in the M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm 
(RSCAAL). The military application of this technology allows remote detection up to 
five kilometers away. This remote detection is attractive in the commercial sector where 
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human safety is vcry imponanL Thi s is not to say that the safety of our women and men 
of the anncd forces is less imponam, bUI the general public is concemed more with 
consumer product safety. 
One respondent stated that mass spectrometer technology also has some dual-use 
potential. The respondent spoke of the technology used in a foreign -prodU(;nj chemical 
detector called the Chemical Agent Monitor (CA/I.·t). The respondent described the CAM 
as a handheld detector that can be carried to the chemically contaminated areas. It could 
also be used to detect haJ3rdoU5 chemical spills hy industrial chemical plant workers in 
proper protective gcar. The respondent further Sialed that alarms and delection devices 
such as the CAM can also be used by individuals in their private homes. 
One respondent felt that radioaetivc monitoring equipmcnt was also an area with 
dual-use potential. The respondent stated that radioactive moni toring is currcntly used in 
the commercial scctor by two agcncics. Thcse agencies arc thc Envirorunental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and FEMA. 
Four respondents felt that the collcctive protection equipment (CPE) also has 
dual-use potential. These respondents slated that ePE provided military protection 
against radiological fallout , and be used in the commercial sector to provide a safc zone 
for hospitals if there is a nat ional emergency. The ePE shelters can also be used to 
provide protection from areas contaminated by toxic chemicals 
One respondent felt that the dual-use of the fac ility is just as important, if not 
more so than the dual-use of the technology. As mentioned earlicr, this respondent's 
agency is practicing the dual-use of their ammunition production facilitics as GOCOs. 
These GOCO facilit ies make explosive propellants such as TNT and composition B. 
Some oft be components like the timers and fuses required to sct off these explosives are 
all made by the same manufacturer. The t imers and fuses made for Government 
explosives would be practically the samc for commercial explosives. 
During the interview and discussion of this issue, scvcral chemical defcnse 
contractors expressed their frustration with the Govenuncnt and its efforts to help sustain 
contractor viability in the chemical industrial base. This frustration has caused one 
contractor to discontinue his production of defense products. This contractor was a 
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proven and reliable produ(er for many years. He was also considered to he the leader in 
his field hy many. The departure of this contractor has left the chemical industrial base 
without a proven producer with the capability to fulfill the requirements in this critical 
area. There are a few other domestic contractors attempting to meet the requirement gap 
in this area. Meeting the requirements means the contractor can successfully produce the 
item and deliver on time. To date, only one domestic producer has been ahle to meet the 
requirements in this area, and this has not been without problems. The problems 
encountered by this small firm have been sufficient to force this firm from the industry 
leaving the base. again, without a viable producer. 
One interview respondent stated that, in an effort to handle some of the challenges 
faced by all producers, hut especially (hemical producers retain viability as defense 
contractors, some finns have attempted to barter with the Government. The respondent 
fclt that these bartering efforts all relate back to the dual-usc of the contractor's facil ity 
The respondent felt that it was acceptahle for a contra(tor to request the Govenunent 
procure his or her commercial products in exchange for maintaining production capability 
for a Government-unique item. The respondent generally felt that the Government 
should be willing to participate in this type of effort, however, the Government expressed 
no interest in such an effon 
During the interview ofthi5 question, several other issues were discussed. These 
areas ranged from "dual-use being only part of the solution" to "DoD enhancing the 
effons of market research teams." The respondents, in general, fclt that dual-use is only 
part oftlle solution for DoD to sustain the defense industrial base. One respondent stated 
that there are other problems in the defense industrial base that cannot be fixed with dual-
usc. The problems perceived by the respondent relate to the la(k of standardization 
between the Services, fai lure of mobilization planning, and failure to resolve reliance on 
foreign producers for critical items. The respondent stated that each Service has its 
chemical items, some of which are even produced by the same manufacturers. 
While discussing the areas that were best suited for dual~use, one respondent with 
some mobilization planning experience stated that dual-use could help eliminate the 
reliance on foreign producers for critical em items The respondent stated that dUring 
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the war with Iraq the 000 discovered that all the years of mobilization planning were 
insufficient to supply the needed protective mask filters. Tht: respondent slated that 
during the Gulf War the U.S. was forced to go to foreign producers to meet the ODS 
requirements. The respondent strongly felt that the Government needs to find a domestic 
source of supply to meet the needs of the industrial base. Relating to this reliance of 
foreign producers, another respondent stated that if the civilian industry cannot meet this 
need, perhaps the DoD must maintain this need at onc of their arsenals or ammunition 
plants (i.e., the dual-usc or GOeOs) 
The issue of market research also surfaced while discussing the em items that 
werc bt:st suited for dual-usc_ The interview respondent stated that the dual-use potential 
could be better served if 000 would ensure that the teams responsible for evaluating the 
requirements do a better job detennining what is available in the civilian sector and how 
it can be modified to meet the Govemment's need . This interview respondent stated· 
The Govemment's mindset has previously been to optimize toward the 
mission needs. Now the focus is changing to optimizing the production 
potential to meet the mission needs at a reasonable cost 
It is perceived among defense contractors that the Government is not helping the 
U.S. industrial base by allowing foreign producers to compete with an already small 
number of domestic contractors for defense requirements. Table V in Chapter n showed 
that two of the nine chemical industrial base producers were foreign. There arc no data 
available at one source to show what the percentage is at the subcomponent level. The 
contractor community perceives that 000 has not done their part to help U.S. businesses 
expand their markets overseas. The sentiment among several of the defense contractors 
interviewed is that if foreign Govemments can promote their companies abroad, so 
should the U.S. One chemical industrial base producer stated, il" the U.s. is not going to 
help them then they need to get out of the way. The U.S. Government restricts the 
products and technologies that commercial producers can export to certain countries. 
The chemical industrial basc producers generally state that it would not cost 
anything for the U.S. Govemment to promote the products they produce commercially 
overseas. These producers felt that because there was a greater chemical threat in some 
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foreign countries an endorsement of their mi litary and commercial products hy the US. 
Goverruncnt would help. This endorsemcnt would permit the U.S. company to capture a 
foreign market shan: and sustain the em through this increase in fon: ign sales of their 
commercial products. The increased purchase of the l i.5. producers commercial products 
abroad will provide a larger business base for the producer. This would all be uo cost to 
the U.S. Government. 
One respondent felt thai the 000. through estahlishing ARPA, revealed its 
support for dual-use technology initiatives. The 000 policy as stated previously , is to 
support dual-use technologies as opposed to military specific development efforts. The 
support of dual-use promotes a positive relationship with the commercial industry. The 
general interview population feels that the acceptance of dual-usc as the cure-all poses a 
risk. The ri sk arises when the U.S. docs not have the teclmologieal capability to support 
the chemical industrial base items needed for contingency. The defense contractors and 
some Government interview respondents felt that the any reliance on foreign producers is 
risky and has an impact on our readiness. 
8. 11 dual-uJe technology were applied to the delmsive chemical equipment in 
Ihe Chemical b,dustrial Bal'e, what are the disadvanlage.f to the Government and 
Defense Contractors? 
One respondent felt that a defense contractor that is solely reliant on DoD for their 
business base may consider dual-usc detrimental to his viability as a defense contractor. 
The respondent stated that some contractors are happy and comfortable with their defense 
business and have no desire to gain a share of the commercial market. "Ibc respondent 
stated that he attained this perception from his years of experience working with 
contractors. The respondent further stated that because the contractor does not have a 
dcsire to they will not make an effort to do so and will lose their competitive status in tht: 
def~nse sector. The competitive status will be lost because they will not be able to lower 
their production cost commensurate with those producers that have adopted dual-use 
methods. 
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Another interview respondent tel! that the previous efforts of awarding research 
and development contracts for proof of principle and system design have the potential to 
lake away research and development efforts from private industry_ The respondent felt 
this way because these contracts a lthough they were Government efforts ",,"ere awarded to 
pri vate tinns. The respondent stated that tht: Government is currently the only entity with 
the financial resources available to invest in high-risk technological areas. The private 
commercial industrit:s cannot afford to take on such risks_ The Government, through 
thcif investments in these high risk areas. arc essentially "growing a capability" in that 
specific technological area. 
One respondent stated that the Government must be extremely careful because the 
commcrcial availability of the system~ formulations and defi(;iencies could be madc 
known to potential cncmies and terrorists. Another respondent stated that the availability 
of such technology to "rogue" nations may allow the enemy to develop COUlJ!ermeasures 
10 the system's capabilitit:s 
In some instan(;es of dual-ust: te(;hnulogy. thc cost may not be as low a~ t:xpectcd. 
One respundent fclt the small quantity production buys of chemical defensive items may 
not make dual-usc as cost effective as it could he Thi~ respondent fclt the increased 
cost due to the smaller buys would nol alluw thc full potential of thc dual-use of 
technology to be recognizcd in tht: chemical industrial base. This ean be countered hy 
promoting the dual-usc of the facility. The lowered cost from the dual-use uflhe fa(;ility 
and would trickle down eventually to lower tht: production cost 
The overwhelming majority uf interview rt:spundents indicated that the 
Govemmt:nt burcaueracy create~ hassles for the contractor. One interview respondent 
staled that the commercial corporate staff is a bureaucracy in itself and i~ just a~ bad as 
tht: Government's. The Govenmlent can control this bureaucracy with effective contracts 
with quality control proct:dures for acceptance and payment liability. One respondent 
stated' 
Thc ·'true" defensc contractors will now havc to make a living in the real 
world. Right now there arc many defensc contractors that COWlt on the 
Government (;ontracts and reimbursements lor storing t:quipment. It is 
their bread and buttcr rhcy do not even try to make it on tht:ir own. We 
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never hear anyone complaining about these welfare recipients. A lot of 
them count on the Government as a paycheck and do not ever produce a 
quality product 
The nature of the cumbersome procurement process puts the Govenmlent at risk 
of companies refusing to do business with 000 because of this prucess, The 
Government needs to look at what is being made and what is needed tu fill the gaps 
9, If dual~use technologies were applied to the defensive chemical equipment in 
the Chemical Industrial Base, what are the advantage!>' In the Government and Defense 
Contractors? 
Thirty-seven percent of the respondents felt that dual-use ofters the CIB the 
potential for lower production costs to Government and industry _ One respondent felt 
that the lowered production eusts will leave more funding avai lable to allow the 
contractor to employ more specialized engineering and support staff to support the base 
One respondent felt that the dual-use of technology would add stability to the 
chemical industrial base. The respondent felt that this would pennit the contractors that 
support the base to re tain defense viability_ Thirty-seven percent of the respondents felt 
that the ability to ramp up rapidly during national emergencies would be improved and 
the startup time for dual-use would be cost effective due to : 
The start-up limes for the Government and contractor would be minimal 
State-of-the-art technology for chemical equipment would always current 
There would be a production line running almost continuously 
One respondent felt that dual-usc offered the cm an opportunity to justity plant 
and equipment for both Govenmlent and commercial use and gain the advantage of the 
lowered operating cost. 
One respondent felt that the DoD bll')iness base has shrunk to a point where doing 
business with DoD is no longer affordable. The respondent felt that in order to gain 
affordability and maintain readiness, savings can be gained through the reuse or joint use 
of the facility. 
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Two respondents fdt that dual-use offered the em the benefit of having more 
than one source 10 the sector. One respondent also felt that dual-usc would allow the 
protection of domestic sources by permitting business 10 remain solvent 
Two respondents felt that dual-use offered stability to the eLB_ In addition to 
stability, the respondents felt that dual-usc offered an opportunity for the Government to 
broaden the CIB by attracting more contractors to do business with the Government 
These rt:spondcnts abo felt that by attracting more producers the requirement fo r 
mobilization planning could be removed 
C. ANALYSIS 
The dual-usc technology concept in the CIB can provide benefits if planned and 
implemented properly. The research indicates that dual-use knowledge exists within the 
Government and the commercial sector. There is no clear guidance or rules concerning 
dual-use. The research also indicates that the restrictive regulatory guidelines that hllve 
plagued many new Government programs in the pa~l may hinder dual-use. 
J. A wareness of dual-uu 
The dual-use technology concept is relatively new to 000. Since its introduction 
in 1989, it has become the newest "buzzword" in 000. There is awareness of the 
concept of dual-usc among the Government, defense contractors, and at least om: person 
in academia. There is limited knowledge about dual-use within 000. This means that 
each agency focuses on its piece of the issue and not on how this piece may have an 
impact on other agencies. The step toward standardization among the 000 agencie~ and 
services could help eliminate this "tunnel vision." 
The problem within DoD is that not everyone is operating from a eonunon 
definition. A conunon definition is important to enahle all participants to work toward 
the common goal of sustaining the elB 
In addition to common tenninology, guid:lllce on implementing dual-use is 
required. The 000 has tried to estllblish common dual-usc ternlinology and preliminary 
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guidam;e through the publication of its Dual-Use Slralef!Y in Fcbruary 1995. The 000 
has an agency with responsihility for dual-usc policy . The agency that published this 
strategy is the Officc of the Undersecretary of Defense for Economic Sccurity, Dual-Use 
Technology Policy . This office is the 000 focal point for dual-use technology policy. 
The Dual-usc Strategy phamplet only begins to sl,;ratch the surface for providing 
guidance and terminology on dual-use. The strategy supports the reforms in acquisition 
by emphasizing how thesc reforms will help change the culture rcquired on dual-use 
success. It also provides DoD an opportunity to make a tremendous impact for dual-use 
efforts hy setting the precedence for ilUlovation by establishing a culture that promotes 
dual-use efforts in major weapon system acquisitions 
2, Use oj tlual-use technology by DoD and other agencies, 
There is awareness of ARPA and the role of this organization in dual-use efforts. 
Most of ARPA 's dual-use eftorts are high risk, high technology dual-use arcas and there 
is little emphasis given to areas such as the ClB. As mentioned in Chapter n, these areas 
arc just as important as the high payoff areas beeausc the services and supplies provided 
by these producers arc just liS critical. lhe DoD should ensure that all sectors of the 
industrial base receive equal emphasis. Each sector of the industrial base is important in 
its own way and deserves monitoring 
There has been limited use of dual-use technology. This has probably because of 
the lack of guidance on promoting dual-use initiatives. The GPS program discussed in 
Chapter II provided an example of the success of dual-use in a program but it also 
revealed the problems that will be encountered in implementing dual-use efforts in major 
system acquisitions. These problems are not beneficial to promoting dual-usc. 
The problems occur because on the onc hand, 000 announced its preferences for 
dual-use efforts (I.e., COTS, NOI, and dual-producing) but when Program Managers 
(PMs) use these methods they are crucified when these cfforts fail. There should be more 
incentive for innovation in 000. The DoD has to establish a culture for promoting 
innovation. If DoD speaks of promoting innovation it mu.~t also support it. lbe DoD, 
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through refonns in acquisition, has reemphasized its support fo r innovation but there have 
not been any dual-use efforts in DoD in major weapon system acquisitions since these 
reforms. 
The 000 should also place more emphasis on dual-producing. Thl: rl:search 
reveals that successful implementation of dual-production in one agency provided lower 
production and faci lity maintenance cost This would be extremely beneficial to small 
sectors of the industrial base likc the CIS 
.1. Application of dual-use to the CIB 
The literature and interview findings all reveal that the dual-use of technology in 
the CIB is possible. Several areas in the cm may benefit more from dual-use effoJ1s than 
others. As stated in the above findings. the areas of dctection, collective protection 
filtration and individual protection are hest suited for dual-use efforts. Although this is 
true, dual-usc of technology has not been applied extensively. This is primari ly because 
there arc still some hurdles to overcome to change the focus from defense-unique items 
and eliminate the stigma associated with chemical warfare production. This stigma is 
probahly due to the lack of knowledge. History has shown that people fear what they 
know litt le about. The best solution for this would be for the CIB producers and the 
Army chemical focal point (CBDCOM) to join fo rces and initiate a positive promotion 
campaign within the commercial sector for the supplies and services manufactured for the 
Defense Department 
The CBDCOM currently has an organization responsible for integrating the 
technologies used throughout CBDCOM. The organization is responsible for 
establishing an interface with indust ry to market these technologies. There arc initiatives 
within ARPA to help market these technologies. These init iatives are thl: TRY and SBIR 
programs. These programs are oriented toward small businesses that specializc in high 
risk technology arcas. 
The research revealed that, although Ihe dual-usc of technology offers a way to 
sustain the (IB, it cannot fix the problems that already exist in the base. The existent 
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prohlems such as the lack of standardization, inability to attract and retain producers, and 
uneconomical quantity procurements cannot hi: fixed by dual-uslo:_ As mentioncd in 
Chaplcr II, prior to Section 110 I of the NDAA for FY 1994, cach service was pennittcd 
to do things its own. The redesignation of thc lead servicc is important and will help 
facilitate standardization and eliminate the majority of the duplications 
4. Chemical defensive equipment production problems 
The production of CDE is plagued by smalilUleeonomie quantity procurements, 
duplication among the Services. small business base and the in ability to anract and retain 
producers. Thcse problems cxist hecause there are no peacetime rcquircments for CDE 
and the only procurements are to rcplace replenislunent stocks or to produce new 
systems. 
Perhaps the most important discovery of this rcsearch was the difficulty in 
attracting ncw and retaining current producers in the eIB. This is a problem that dual-usc 
can help but cmmot eliminatc. Dual-use could offer new producers thc opportunity to 
share their production costs between their commercial and military efforts. 'Ibis shared 
cost would depend on the percentage share of the production allocated anlOng the 
Govcrnment and the contractor's commercial customcrs. rhe retention of clUTCnt 
produccrs may find somc relief with the implementation of FASA. The rclief will be 
providcd hy the preferences for commercial products, specifications and standards. This 
research revealed that one cm producer departed thc cm and ceased production of 
defense products because of the Governments previous acquisition practices of awarding 
to the lowest cost producer. The research revealed that this producer expressed no 
interest in returning to defense production. This producer was a reliable. reasonable, and 
responsible producer. 
The 000 chemical focal point should reestablish contact with this producer and 
encourage him to reconsider the business opportunities available to his company UDder 
the dual-use initiatives and acquisition refoon. 
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5. Dual· use (lnd lpecial procedure.\ 
The dual-use of technology in the CIB may require some special procedures. The 
rcsean:h reveals that special procedures would be necessary to determine if the strengths 
and weaknesses of the systems should be released_ Although, there are mixed reviews on 
this issue, the best judgment would be to follow the old rult: "better to be safe than sorry." 
The special nature of the elB dual-use technology could permit the use of these 
weapons against thc American publ ic in terrorist type incidents. The possihi lity of a 
terrorist incident poses a national security risk. The usc of special procedures to limit 
access to the tcdmology wuld probably decrease the risk. The downside to these special 
procedures is that they inherently redu(;e tht: flexibility required for successful dual-usc 
implemcntation 
The use of special procedures may be useful for delineating the intellectual 
property and copyrights of the Govt:nuncnt and thc contractors involved in dual-use 
efforts. 
rhe 000 in establishing guidance for dual-usc efforts should wnsider special 
procedures and instructions on a case-by-case basis. 
6. Chemical defensive equipment be.\·t suitedfor dual-use 
There are some areas in the CIB that may bt:nefit mon: from dual-use efforts than 
others. This research revealed three specific areas with the lxst dual-ust: pott:ntiaJ. These 
Dt:tection (chemical, biological and radiological) 
Collective protection filtration 
Individual protection (protective mask and clothing) 
It is likely that these areas were most prevalent among the interview respondents 
because there is current commercial use of some of the items in use in FEMA. During 
the last five years fEMA has been actively involved in varioll~ catastrophic accidents and 
incidents throughout the nation 
In addition to FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has caused 
increascd public recognition of the hazards caused by radioactive radon. Radon is a 
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naturally occurring radioactive contaminant and, because it is an alpha emitter, thc 
continued exposure over time is cumulative and more dangerous with prolonged 
exposure. The EPA heightened awareness among the general public and promoted the 
desire of "John Q. Public" 10 purchase radioactive monitoring devices to detcmline what 
level of radon is in his or her home. 
Ibe recent incidents of terrorist activity in Japan involving military-grade 
chemical munitions against the general public has also promoted the desire by private 
citizens to obtain protcctive mask and clothing for their families. These areas ofler more 
potential in the commercial market for dual-use efforts. Military chemical detectors with 
the capability 10 detect and identify chemical contaminants up to five kilometers away are 
very attractive in the commercial sector. As previously mentioned, the safety factor 
provided by a stand-off detector is also a very attr<lctive feature. 
The issue of foreign sources must be addrcssed with are<ls suited for dual-use. In 
some instances, there are items in the elB that are produced solely by <I foreign source. 
Specifically, thc carbon used for the all protective filters is a foreign-based source. Dual-
use could help to decrease and eventually eliminate this reliance on a foreign source. The 
000 should test the commercial grade carhon for use in military filters. Additionally, 
DoD should pursue dual-use eITorts to establish a domestic source for carbon. 
7. Duul-ul'e db;udvanlages 
There are some disadvantages of dual-usc in the chemical industrial base. These 
disadvantages prim<lrily rclate to the cost savings that will be generated. The 
Government hi storically has overrdted cost savings. For example, initial Defense 
Department reports to the media on the cost savings estimated hy the Base Re<llignment 
and Closure Conunission (BRAC) wcre higher than actual savings. This may also be true 
for dual-use efforts. In an efiort to minimize this, 000 should appoint one point of 
contact for conducting the cost estimates and cost effectiveness evaluations to retain 
conSistency 
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Another disadvantagt: may be that there may be some arellS when: there is limited 
or no dual-use potential. One such area is the decontamination area. The toxicity of OS-
2. a military-grade decontaminating agent. limits ils dual-use potential. It is more toxic 
and COITosiv l;,': than the strongest commercial decontaminating agents. In this day and age, 
wilh the emphasis on envirorunental concerns. the I:ummercial sector is producing 
decontaminating agents that neutralize the industrial chem icals and arc friendly to the 
environment. 05-2 does not meet this criteria. The Government should evaluate 
replacing DS-2 wi th a decontaminating agent that meets the military decontamination 
requirements and is kss toxic than DS-2 
The uneconomical quantity procurements and the low dollar value of the cm 
contracts combined with the large start-up cost discourages commercial contractors from 
conducting business with the Government. The commercial contractor is looking for the 
bottom-line, profit. The above items do not provide a means for contractors to increase 
their bottom line. In fact , these items decrease the profit margin 
8. Dual-use advantages 
r here are several potential advantages avai lable to the cm from dual-usc. These 
advantages were covered in the previous chapter. The research reveals Ihat the majority 
of the interview respondents felt that the advantages of dual-usc far outweighed the 
disadvantages. 
One ofthc most important potential benefits from dual-use is the ability to attract 
new producers into the CIB . The opportunities for new producers would be the ability to 
split the start-up cost betwecn the Govcrnment and commercial production efforts. This 
alone could substantially lower a product ' s production co~t and incrcasc the producer's 
profit margin 
The attraction of new producers to the cm is important because it offers the 
availability of more than one producer for CDE. This is extremely crucial in national 
emergencies because if one producer is unable 10 rapidly attain his surge capacity, the 
availability of two or more producers increases the production capacity. This meaJlS thaI 
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a production capability would be available almost continuously and may reduce the 
mobilization planning requirements. 
Another important benefit provided by dual-use is the retention of cum:nt 
producers in thc base. Retaining current producer~ stablizcs the ha~e with experienced 
and reliable producers. The retention of current producers also provides opportunities for 
these producers to gain access to the c0mmercial market. The 000 should promote dual-
use through the advantages and benefits it offers the producers because if the producers 
win the Government also wins. 
D. SlJMMARY 
The research reveals that the dual-u~e technology concept is supported by all 
levels of the federal Government from the executive kvci down to the legislative level. 
The support is very strong among defense contractors duc to the potential henefits for 
lower costs. The interview results ~how that the dual-u~e technology concept can be 
applied to the elB. The "how" of its application is situation dependent based on 
technology. The research reveals that the dual-usc technology concept applie~ not only 
to the technology but also to the use of the faci lity for dual-production of commercial 
and military equipment and supplies. The research also reveals that in an effort to 
achieve dual-production efTort~, the Government is not interested in bartering with 
defense contractors to obtain production capability for ClB items. 
The dual-use of technology ofTers the CIB the potential for lowering the costs of 
production and the end item cost in several area". These areas are collective protection 
filtration, chemical, biological, and radiological detection, and individual protection. 
These areas were the most popular choices among the interview respondents for the items 
that would reap the most benefits from the dual-use concept. 
The research reveals that the lack of standardization of similar items among the 
four Services has an impact on the uneconomic quantity procurements in the CIB. These 
procurements may have an impact on the benefits of dual -use. 
Although dual-use has numerous heneiits, there is a downside to dual-use as well. 
The system's strengths and weaknesses would be available to the general public as well 
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as potential enemies . This availability poses a nationa l security fisk to the nations' 
ut:fcnsl:. This would be an a rea that ml:rits furthl: r I:valuation to detennine the risks to 
nat ional securi ty. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMM ENDATIONS 
A. IN"TRODUCTION 
rhis thesis dctt:nnind that dual-use technology can be applied to tht: chemical 
indust ria l hase. lbis thesis furt her dctcnnined that with the application of dual-use, the 
chemical industrial hase attains the benefits of sustaining the base and the producers. 
retaining prov<:1l producers, lowering the cost of production, and gaining dual-use of the 
production facili ties. In this chapter the thesis research questions arc answered and 
recommendations are made for areas further study. This thesis further detemlined that 
there is a strong supp0l1 within the 000 for dual-usc ventures. 
R. CONCLUSIONS 
The summarized answers to each research question presented in Chapter I an:: as 
follows. The answers to the subsidiary research questions will be presented first because 
tht:y lay tht: foundation for answt:ring tht: primary research que~tion 
1. Subsidiary Rewarch Questions 
Tnt: subsidiary research questions for this thesis were as follow~ : 
What is the eIB? 
Tht: cm is one of tht: major st:etors of the DIB It is comprised of producers of 
the defensive chemical equipment and supplies rt:quired to support our anned forces if 
there is an offensive chemical attack 
What f)'pes of industries make up this eIB? 
The CIB sector of DIB is comprised of approximately 40 defense eontrnetors, 
domestic and fort:ign. The maj ority of tnt: industries are small businesses that rely oCthe 
000 for mort: than fifty pcrct:nt of their business hase. TIle CIB producers supply 
service and sUP'POrt \0 the following technology areas: 
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Miniaturization technology in detection and deetronic modules, 
microphones and audio equipment 
Printed circuit hoards 
Lithium batteries 
Anti-gas cloth 
Textile manufacture of filter fabric-carbun spheres 
Polyethylene liner, hennetieally scaled filter canisters 
Carbon impregnating 
What makcs the Chemical sector unique from other sectors of the Dl8? 
The Chemical sector of the 018 is unique from other sectors primarily due to the 
special and unique nature of the equipmelll produced in tIle base . There arc pereeptiuns 
that there are negative connotations associated with chemical warfare. These negative 
connotations act as an inhibitor to attract new producers into the base 
Another trait of the chemical sector is irregular, small quantity procurements. The 
CDE produced in the chemical sector is only reqUIred in the event of a chemical attack 
during contingency operations, which does not allow nonnal economic quantity 
procurements In addition to the small, irregular procurements, the lack of 
standardiliLtion of COE among the four Services also adds to this unique nature of the 
base. If all the Services pooled their requirements, then the quantities could become more 
economic and more regular. 
What is dual-use technology and how does it relate to the CIH? 
The dual-use of technology is technology that has commercial and military 
potential. It may be either NDI, COTS, or a combination of the two. ·Ibe dual-use 
technolugy cuncept also applies to the facility where the technologies are produced. It 
relates to the e18 because it is a means for contractors that produce defensive chemical 
equipment to retain their viability in the base and gain a share of the commercial market. 
Dual-usc provides a means for lowering the production cost of equipment. 
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Does thc cllrrent situation of thc Depa rtment of Defense budget a nd 
downsaing req uirc the application of dual-usc technology? 
The 0 00 budget docs not require the application of dual-use; however, the 
projections of further budget reductions require some action be taken to negate the 
possibili ty of not being able to support the CDE need~ of the soldier. The dual-use of 
technology is a logical possibility to allow DoD to minimize cost, and to sustain the base 
and its producers. 
The 000 focal point for dual-usc of technology efforts within DoD, ARPA, has 
received extensive funding for dual-use efforts under the TRP and SRIR programs. The 
RDT& E budget for ARPA has doubled during a five-year period when the 000 budget 
was declining. The SBiR program specifically focuses on small business innovative 
ellorts in designated critical technology areas 
What are the DoD's goals and objectives concerning dual-use technology 
The goals and objectives of 000 concerning dual-use technology are to promote 
the dual-use of technology beneficial to the Defense Department. 000 strongly supports 
dual-use initiatives as indicated by the increased funding for ARPA's TRP. 000 also 
supports Ihe dual-use of GO CO facilities through facility contracting. 
HOll' can du al-use technology be applied to the e lB? 
Dual-use can be applied to the cm at the component system level. The stand-off 
chemical detectors and hand-held chemical detectors have the technology that is easily 
adaptablc for the commercial sector. The carbon used in particulate filters can also be 
used in the production of commercial grade filters to monitor toxic chemicals at industrial 
chemical facil ities 
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What are the disadvantages of dual-use technology to the CIR? 
The availability of the technology to the general public exposes the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system to potential enemies. Thc additional costs incurred from 
indemnitication under dual-use of GOCO facilities potentially offsets any cost savings 
realized from the dual-use of the technology. 
What are the advantages of dual-use technology to the CIR? 
Dual-use technology providcs an opportunity to sustain thc cm and the producers 
in the base. It provides the opportunity to lower the costs of production and subsequently 
the cost of the item and an opportunity for GOCO facilities to be used for defense and 
commercial advances. This offers the potential to lower the cost of operating and 
maintaining the facili ty 
2. Primary Research Question 
Finally, the primary thrust of this thesis wa~: What arc the benefits of using the 
concept of dual-use technology to sustain the CIB? 
The dual-use of technology can provide susluinment to the chemical industrial 
base and the producers only if there is a commercial need for the item. The sustainment 
of the base must also be support by DoD and defense contractors. The producers in the 
CIB will be able to maintain continuous operation of their production facilities. The dual-
use of technology provides access. It provides thc Government and defense contractors 
access to state-of-the-art technology at reduced cost. 'fbis access to high technology also 
provides an opportunity for the Government and the eontmctor to obtain equipment 
upgrades with technology at reduced cost. 
The dual-use of technology provides defense contractors an opportunity to gain 
access to commercial markets, both domestic and fore ign. The access to these markcts 
does not promise success. The contractors must market their companies and products 
accordingly to gain and retain a share of these markets. Thc access to the foreign market 
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will mean that the em producer may be required to modify his or her product or service 
to meet the unique requircmcnts of the foreign market 
The availability of the em teclmology to all domestic and foreign sources 
provides the general puhlic and the U.S. cncmy the strengths and weaknesses of the 
technology of the weapon system. so this is a potential diadvantage. 
Thc dual-use of technology otTers the advantage to both thc Government and the 
contractor to lower the cost of production aJld the end item. This lowered cost also 
affords the opportunity to buildup the production base 4uickl y. With this lower cost. the 
contractor would be afforded the opportunity to attain a bcttcr engineering and support 
staff and the Govenunent would be able to obtain the capability to cxtcnd the chemical 
industrial base surge capacity 
The dual-use of technology concept provides an avenue for the Governmcnt to 
reevaluate the need for mobilization planning. Thc continuous availability of the 
production capability ncgates the need for mobilization planning. 
C. RECOMMENDA nONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The below listed area~ are recommended for furthcr study: 
Determine erreetivene~~ of du~l-use in sustllining the DID lind its sectors. 
This research detennined that dual·use of tcchnology has the potential to be a 
mcans \u allow sustainment of thc em and its producers. Additional research should 
focus on thc specific applications of dual -use to other sectors of the DTIB and how it has 
provided sustainmcnt. lowered cost, aJld allowed defense contractors tu capturc a share of 
the commercial market. 
Develop II pilot project to test dual-use applielltion to the CIB lind develop 
spedfie measures of cffceth:cncss to determine if dual-usc achieved , ucces, in 
su~tlliniDg the CIR. 
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Thcre have been no direct applications of dual-use 10 the cm. Therc have only 
been projects of its applicability and potential benefits. The areas identified in this 
research as best suited for dual-usc should be uscd to develop the project 
Additional research should be done to evaluate the reasons defense 
contractors are leaving the defense industry and what impact the dual-use of 
tedmology might have. 
Throughout this research, the perception among defense contractors was that the 
Government was not concerned with their success or failure as DTIB or CIB producers. 
This rescarch revcaled that this perception caused at lea~t one proven and reliable 
produccr to discontinue defense operatiuns. A detailed mmlysis of the perceptions and 
problems among the small defcnse contractors should be conducted. fhis analysis should 
also evaluatc what impact thc dual-ru;e of technology might havc 
Establish a pilot project to test dual-producing in the eIB. 
The dual-production efforts of une agency reveals that significant cost savings can 
be attained from this effort. The evaluation of this project should be conducted in one of 
the areas best suited for dual-use. The evaluation should also determine the cost 
effectivcness of the project for actual savings to DoD and the defense contractors. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
My namc is Captain Gwendolyn O. Dingle. 1 am a student at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 1 am conducting intcrvicws for usc as input to my 
Master's thesis. J would like to solicit your views on the dual-use of technology and 
whethcr this concept can be used to sustain thc production of chcmical defensive 
equipment within the Chemical Industrial Base 
Dual-use technology is the production of supplies and equipment by dcfcnse 
contractors on the same production line that is used to produ(;e supplies and equipment 
for eommcrcial customers. Currcnt examples oflhe dual-usc oftcchnology arc the 9-mm 
Berel1:a <md the Global Positioning Systcm. The objective of my thesis is to dctennine 
how dual-usc can be used to sustain thc chcmical industrial basc. That is why I am 
looking to people likc you for comments and advicc. 
( would like to conduct telcphonc intcrviews with a representative of your 
organization during the week 24 April- 28 May 1995. The estimated time for conduct of 
the interview is approximately 30 minutes. To expedite the interviews. J have encloscd a 
copy of the questions to hc askcd during the interview for your review. 
All information gathered for this thesis will be combincd with other responses and 
this will assure the anonymity of each participant. 
Thank. you, for your input If you have questions, please feel free to contact me at 
your convenience. 
Captain Gwendolyn O. Dingle 
SMC 1093 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
(DSN) 878-2536 voiccmail #1093 
(Comm.) (408) 656-2536 voicemail #1093 
(Fax) DSN: 878-2138 
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I . DEMOGRAPHICS 
lob Title· ___ _ _ _ _ _ . 
Location and Office Symbol · 
Series or Grade: _________________ _ 
Years of Experiencc working dual-use technology issucs: _ ______ _ 
Years of Govcrnment experience _____________ _ 
Years in current position: _______________ _ 
2. Has your agency used dual-use technology? 
3. Do you know of any other agency that has used dual-use technology? 
4. Do you think the dual-use technology concept can be applied to defensive chemical 
equipment in the Chemical Industrial Base? Why'? 
5. What is wrong with the production of defensive chemical equipment in the Chemical 
Industrial Base that could be remedied by applying dual-use technology? 
6. If dual-use technology is applied 10 the defcnsive chemical equipment in the Chemical 
Industrial Base should there be special procedures or instructions on how, when and 
where to use the concept to ensure that is applied effectively? 
7. Of the chemical defensive equipment produced in thc Chemical Industrial Basc which 
lends itself more to the usc of dual-use lechnology? 
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8. Is dU<lI-u~e technology the solution ror 000 \0 sustain smal l sectors of the Defense 
Industrial Base like the Chemical Industrial Base? 
9_ If dual -use technology were applied to the defensive chemical equipment in the 
Chemical Industrial Uasc, what are the disadvantages to the Government and Defense 
Contractors') 
10. If dual-use tedUlology were applied to the defensive chemical equipment in the 




APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Bachncr, Gl:orgc, Sl:nior Liaison Engincl:r Govcmml:nt Produds, MinI: Safcty 
Appliances, Murraysville, Pennsylvania 15668, May 1995. 
Branscomb, Ll:wis, M. , Dirl:ctor, Scicncc Tcdmology and Public Policy in thc Center for 
Sl:il:nce and International Affairs, lohn F. Kl:nnedy School of Govenunent, Harvard 
University, 79 JFK Street. Cambridge, Massachusett~ 021])\, April 1995. 
Blischc, John, Physical Scientist, U.S. Army Medical Research Institut<: for Chemical 
Defense, ATTN: MCMR-UV-RC, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG ), 
Edgewood, Maryland 21010, May 1995. 
Roswe, Sal, Special Assistant to Deputy Assistant Sel:retary of Defense for 
Chemical/Biological fI.-1attcrs, 2451 Crystal Drive Room 640, Arlington, Virginia 22245 , 
May 1995 
Carril:o, Jack, Industrial Spel:ialist, HQ AMCCOM, ATTN: AMSMC-IRJ\, Rock hland, 
Illinois 61299-6000, April 1995. 
Dfleas, KClUlcth. Programs Coordinator Commercial Division/Contract Administration, 
Donaldson Corporation, Mailstop ]65, MilUleapolis, MilUlcsota 55440, May 1995. 
fcin, Saul, Dircctor of Markcting, Intcllitech, 2000 Brunswick Lane, Dcland, Florida 
32724, May 1995 
Fox, William, Proccss Managcr for Industrial Base Assessment, CRDCOM, Edgewood 
Area, Aberdecn Proving Ground, Edgewood, Maryland 21010, May 1995. 
Gonano, Ronald, Anny Domestic Transfer Manager, Director, Anny Research 
Laboratory, 2800 Powdennill Road, Adelphi, Maryland 20783-1197, May 1995. 
Huber, Joseph Colonel, lkadquarters, Dcpartment of the Army Offic·e of thc Deputy 
Chief" of Staft', Operations, Chemical and NBC Defensc Division (DAMO-FDB), 
Washington, D.C. 20]10, May 1995. 
LeBlanc, Ray, PMNBC Defense Systems, Team Leader, ATTN: AMCPM-NN-C, 
Edgewood Area Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgcwood, Maryland 21010, May 1995 
Lopl:Z, Lieutenant Colonel, HQDA Action Officer, HQDA DCSOPS, AnN: DAMO· 
FOB , Washington, D,C 20310, May 1995 
Miller, David P., Lieutenant Colonel, ARMS Program Manager and Chief of Industrial 
Base Procurement of the Industrial Operations Command (I0C), ATTN: AMSMC-Pi\-J, 
Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000, May 1995. 
Negron, Adolpho, Al CPS System Manager, ATTN: SCBRD-CE-AICPS, Edgewood 
Research Development ,md Engineering Center (ERDEC), Edgewood Area, Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, Edgewood, Maryland 21010, May 1995. 
Rakaczky, 101m, Physical Scientists, Oflice of Research and Technology Applications 
(ORT A), A'ITN: SCBRD-ASC, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood, 
Maryland 3 I 0 1 0, May 1995. 
Sasmor, Robert, Anny Representative to Technology Reinvestment Project, Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, 4050 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22203, May 1995 
Thedford, Dehra A., Major, Total Asset Visibility Task Force, 630 1 Litt le River 
rumpike, Suite 320, Alexandria, Virginia 22312, May 1995. 
rhomas, Richard, Vice President, Engineering, Environmental Technologies Group, Inc .. 
Baltimore, Maryland 21284, May 1995. 
Windesheim, Druce, Director Material, Alhan Enterprises. Camp 942 1 Hrookmede Court. 
Ellicott City. Maryland, 21042, May 1995. 
Vinyard, Mary , Industrial Specialist, i\mlament. Chemical, Ammunition and Logistics 



































APPENDIX C. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Aftl:r Action Report 
Armament, Chemical, Ammunition and Logist ics 
Agency 
American Defense Preparedness Association 
Aberdt':t':n Proving Ground 
Advanced Resl:areh Projects Agency 
U.S. Anny Armament, Munitions and Chemical 
Command 
Battle Dress Overgarmeot 
Base RealiglUllent and Closure Commissioo 
Bottom Up Rt':vit':w 
Chemical Agt':nt AllIml 
Chemical Agent Monitor 
Chemical Biological Defense 
U.S. Army Cht':miclll and Uiologieal Defense Command 
Chemical Defensive Equipment 
Chemical Industrial BlIst': 
Collective Protective Equipmt':nt 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Department of the AmlY 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Database Management System 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations 
Director of Ddl:nse Research and Engint':l:ring 
Defense Industrial Base 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Department of Defense 
Department of Energy 
Defense Production l\et 
Defense Systems Management College 
Defense Technology Industrial BaSI: 
Enginet':ring Change I'roposal 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
Environmental Protection Agency 






































Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Fiscal Year 
General Accounting Office 
Oovcnuncnt Furnished Equipment 
Government Owned Contractor Operated 
General Service 
("Iobal Positioning System 
House Armed Services Commiuee 
Headquarters 
Industrial Operations Command 
Joint Logistic Commander 
Logistics Management InstitUle 
Modular Collective Protection Equipment 
Memorandum of Agreement 
Measure of Effectiveness 
Measure of Perfonnam;e 
Major Regional Contingem;y 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
National Aeronautical Space Administration 
Kational Defense Authorization Act 
Non Devdopmentalltem 
Nucli:ar, Biological and Chemical 
NBC Reconnaissance System 
National Security Strategy 
Operation Desert Shield/Stonn 
Other Procurement Army 
Office of Research and Technology Applications 
Operational Requirements Document 
Operations and Support 
Office ofT echnology Assessment 
Operations Other Than War 
Project (Product) Management Office 
Research and Development 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm 








Technology Reinvestment Project 
L S. Anny Chemical Schoo! 
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